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In this thesis, I examine the role of the National Guard in supporting current 
National Security and National Military Strategy.  I argue that the global security 
environment has changed drastically since the end of the Cold War, making “Homeland 
Security” a primary mission for the military, specifically the National Guard.  
Concurrently, the unprecedented number of overseas deployments to perform 
peacekeeping missions has severely affected the active Army’s combat capability.  I 
argue that the US Army has not embraced the requirements for “Homeland Security,” 
focusing instead on maintaining its 10 active division force structure.  To meet the needs 
of National Military Strategy, the active Army has instead relied on the reserve 
components to perform overseas peacekeeping missions.  I argue that the National Guard 
has also looked to performing these missions as a method of institutional survival.  
Together, both components have undermined the Constitutional underpinnings of the 
Reserve Component as a strategic reserve, to be mobilized in cases of “war or national 
emergency.”  I argue that making “Homeland Security” a primary federal mission of the 
National Guard, along with restructuring current combat, combat support, and combat 
service support ratios will allow the National Guard to support National Military Strategy 
and “Homeland Security.”   
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 I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the aftermath of September 11, the terms “Homeland Defense” and “Homeland 
Security” have become the watchwords for national security in the 21st Century.  The 
Bush administration’s efforts to create an all-encompassing Department of Homeland 
Security lend credence to how seriously the government considers the probability and 
consequences of future attacks on U.S. soil.  Not surprisingly, the National Guard has 
been identified as a key player in consequence management.  I argue that three factors 
contribute to the reliance upon the National Guard in responding to future domestic 
attacks:  The first is location. Due to the National Guard’s distribution of manpower and 
equipment across 3200 armories in all 54 states and territories, it is uniquely suited to 
mobilize and respond to future emergencies virtually anywhere in the United States, 
within hours of an attack.  Secondly, the National Guard is not hampered by the federal 
restrictions of Posse Comitatus.  Members of the National Guard can be mobilized 
immediately by the Governor of each state without restriction, whereas the mobilization 
of federal military forces requires the approval of the cabinet and President.  In addition, 
the support rendered by active forces must meet strict federal criteria1 to ensure they are 
not involved in any type of law enforcement.  Although it may seem to be governmental 
red tape, this restriction upon federal forces employed domestically ensures that our 
military maintains a credible degree of separation between the military and law 
enforcement.  Together, the chain of approval and Posse Comitatus restrictions add up to 
serious delays in the capability of federal forces to respond to domestic emergencies, 
whereas the National Guard can be called out immediately.   Last but not least, providing 
military support to civilian authorities is a unique, “state” mission of the National Guard.  
Over its 366 year history, the National Guard has excelled in responding to local and 
regional emergencies. I argue that the relationships it has built with local and federal 
                                                 
1 Refer to Army Field Manual 100-19, “Domestic Support Operations,” Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
Washington, D.C., 1 July 1993.  Available online at http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/100-
19/fm10019.htm . Accessed 14 October 2002. 
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 agencies, and the experience it has gained performing domestic disaster relief missions 
make the National Guard perfectly suited to managing the consequences of future 
terrorist attacks on domestic soil. 
However, in spite of these logical arguments for its use, there is considerable 
resistance to making Homeland Security the primary mission of the National Guard.  
This resistance comes from both the active military and surprisingly, from within the 
National Guard leadership itself.  I argue that the primary reason behind this resistance is 
institutional survival.  This concept of institutional survival is broken into two related 
components: first, the appropriation of federal funds; and second, institutional relevance.  
Federal funding is the lifeline of the military, and each component jealously guards its 
share of the annual budget.  This funding is dependent upon each component’s perceived 
importance, or institutional relevance, to the execution of current National Military 
Strategy.  In the current era of draw down and budget cuts, institutional survival is at the 
forefront of each military component.  The active military provides the National Guard 
with all of its equipment, and finances its training and equipment OPTEMPO.2  This 
funding is principally to ensure that the National Guard is capable of performing its 
constitutional mission: mobilizing and deploying as a strategic reserve in times of “war 
or national emergency.”  Since the active component funds the National Guard, it wants 
federal funding to directly support this constitutional mandate.  I argue that in the Army’s 
mindset, “Homeland Security” is a secondary, “state” mission of the National Guard.  
The Army agrees that “Homeland Security” is a core competency of the National Guard, 
and that the National Guard should be a key player in consequence management.  
However, the active Army does not want to directly fund preparedness for what it 
believes is a secondary, “state” mission.  The current initiatives to make “Homeland 
Security” a primary, federal mission for the National Guard also brings up an age-old 
issue between the National Guard and the Active military:  The issue of federal control 
over the reserve components.   
                                                 
2 OPTEMPO is a military term meaning “Operational Tempo.”  OPTEMPO funds pay for equipment use, 
maintenance, and soldier “man-days.” A “man-day” is the equivalent of placing one soldier on active duty orders for 
one day.  The federal government funds each national guardsman with 15 days of “Annual Training” and 48 days of 
drill per year, at a minimum. 
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 Since the end of the Cold War, the active military has had to face both cutbacks in 
size and funding, while at the same time responding to a new National Military Strategy 
of “forward engagement.”  The active military has deployed an unprecedented number of 
times over the last 11 years to “shape” the global security environment through the 
performance of peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions.  These 
deployments for “military operations other than war” have had a documented adverse 
effect upon the active military’s overall combat readiness.  I argue that the active Army 
can not continue to support the National Military Strategy of “shaping” the international 
security environment at the current rate, and maintain its combat capability to “respond” 
with overwhelming superiority in times of war.  Since the end of the Cold War, it has 
increasingly looked to the National Guard and Reserves to help it perform the “shaping” 
requirement of National Military Strategy.  Since the active military funds the National 
Guard, I argue that the active component wants these funds to go directly towards the 
execution of National Military Strategy, not “Homeland Security.”   
Meanwhile, the National Guard and Reserves have been on a search for relevance 
since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.  The primary reason for their existence (and 
funding) was to respond to simultaneous large-scale conflicts in Europe and North 
Korea3.  With the disappearance of this immediate threat, the relevance of the National 
Guard and Reserves was called into question.  At the same time the active military was 
searching for help in performing overseas stability and support missions, the National 
Guard and Reserves were searching for a new mission.  Together, they have proposed 
and executed a solution that seemingly fits the needs of all components:  the National 
Guard and Reserves have mobilized and deployed overseas at an unprecedented level to 
perform military operations other than war.  This mutual performance of missions in 
support of National Military Strategy has been bolstered recently by federal initiatives to 
integrate the armed services.  In the last decades of the 20th century, the active military 
embarked upon an aggressive program to integrate its three components (active, reserve, 
                                                 
3 Known as the “Two Major Theater War” or “Two-MTW” scenario.  This scenario has been a primary planning 
factor for the Army over the last 40 years.  The specifics and efficacy of this planning factor will be discussed in detail 
in chapter III.  
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 and national guard) into one fighting force with common equipment and a common 
purpose.  With the increased funding, more modern equipment, and a blurring of the 
distinctions between the active military member and his National Guard and Reserve 
counterpart, there has been an increasing demand upon the reserve components to 
perform their share of the requirements of National Military Strategy. 
However, there are historical distinctions between the three components of the 
military that were originally designed into the US Constitution by the founding fathers.  
Distinctions that were not intended to be blurred.  By design, each component of the 
military serves a role in the grand scheme of “checks and balances” that characterize the 
nature of the US government.  In addition, the soldiers themselves are different in one 
key aspect:  active military members are soldiers by profession.  The National Guard and 
Reserves are comprised of “citizen-soldiers,” who are every-day civilians that may be 
called upon in times of war or national emergency to mobilize, deploy, and fight.  These 
“citizen-soldiers” face unique situations with their employers whenever they are 
mobilized, and count upon their employers’ support.  This support has waned 
tremendously since the 1991 Gulf War, and the National Guard is witnessing record 
complaints by employers and soldiers over involuntary deployments overseas for 
peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention missions.  The major bone of contention is 
that these overseas stability and support operations, while supporting National Military 
Strategy, do not support the constitutional requirement for deployment in cases of “war 
or national emergency.” 
In this thesis, I argue that the latest trend of transformation of the military, 
specifically the United States Army’s integration of the active Army, the Army National 
Guard and the Army Reserve into one force labeled “The Army,” puts the constitutional 
framework of the military that the founding fathers intended into jeopardy.  I argue that 
the downsizing of the active Army in the post-Cold War era, coupled with the changes to 
National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy have forced the active Army to 
look to the National Guard and Reserves to help fulfill its obligations to “shape” the 
global security environment.  The National Guard and Reserves have also looked to the 
performance of these overseas deployments in support of National Military Strategy as a 
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 method of institutional survival.  With the performance of stability and support 
operations overseas, the National Guard and Reserves have ensured their relevance in 
future funding battles. 
Meanwhile, the threats to national security have changed tremendously over the 
same time frame.  I argue that the greatest perceived threat to US national security over 
the next 20 years is from attacks on our population centers, government, and 
infrastructure on domestic soil.  Responding to these types of asymmetric attacks on our 
homeland forms the basis of the “Homeland Security” mission.  I argue that the National 
Guard is perfectly suited for this role in equipment, training, and manpower, and that 
“Homeland Security” should be a primary, federally supported mission for the National 
Guard.  In essence, I argue that “Homeland Security,” currently a secondary, “state” 
mission of the National Guard, should be elevated to a primary, federal mission.  
“Homeland Security” should complement the existing mission of the National Guard as a 
“strategic reserve,” not replace it.  I contend that assigning “Homeland Security” to the 
National Guard as a primary mission supports the third leg of National Military Strategy 
to “Prepare Now” for future conflicts, and reinforces its constitutional role as the primary 
protector of our homeland. 
This thesis will argue that the current path of the Army to blend its three 
components into a “Total Force,” specifically the requirement of reservists to deploy 
overseas, is fundamentally changing the checks and balances structure of the military that 
the framers had originally intended.  Deploying the National Guard and Army Reserve 
overseas to perform the National Military Strategy of “Shaping” the global security 
environment marks a significant departure from its constitutional role as a strategic 
reserve.  Secondly, I will argue that the requirements of National Military Strategy were 
fundamentally misinterpreted by the active Army, based upon its fixation on the outdated 
“two major theater war” scenario, and a desire not to repeat the mistakes of past draw 
downs.  I argue that the actual requirement of National Military Strategy is for the 
National Guard to return to its roots as the primary agency for responding to domestic 
threats, and perform “Homeland Security” as a primary, federally funded mission. 
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 In the first chapter, I will review the organization, roles, and missions of the 
active Army and its reserve components, focusing specifically on the Army National 
Guard.  I will describe the Constitutional and legal underpinnings of the National Guard, 
focusing primarily on its federal mission of supporting the active Army during wartime, 
and its equally important, legally unique “state” mission of providing military support to 
civil authorities.  I will also show that “Homeland Security” has always been a primary, 
constitutional mission for the National Guard.  This chapter will detail how history has 
shaped the relationship between the Army and the Guard, and how it has led to the force 
structure we know today.  By documenting the legal framework, structure, and missions 
of each component, I hope to lay the groundwork for a better understanding of the 
capabilities and limitations of the Army, The Army Reserve, and the Army National 
Guard in transforming into a “Total Force.”  
In the second chapter, I will describe the major changes to the global security 
environment over the past decade, and its profound effects on the utilization of the 
Reserves and National Guard.  I will document the change in National Military Strategy 
from one of deterrence to that of forward engagement.  I will show how the resulting 
twenty-fold increase in deployments required to maintain a global engagement posture 
has sapped the US Army’s capability to perform what it perceives as its primary mission: 
responding to two major theater wars.  This situation forced the active Army to look to 
the National Guard and Reserves to help it meet the operational requirements of National 
Military Strategy.   
The third chapter will show how the active Army fundamentally misinterpreted 
the requirements of National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy.  
Determined not to repeat the mistakes made during previous draw downs of the 20th 
century,  the Army jealously guarded its ten active component divisions.  When the 
unexpected number of overseas deployments in the “Shaping” strategy began to affect 
the combat readiness for its “Respond” requirement, it looked to the Reserves and the 
National Guard to fill the gap.  Instead of re-affirming the National Guard’s 
Constitutional role to protect the population against domestic violence, and strengthening 
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 its capabilities to perform Homeland Security, the Army developed a new role for the 
Guard that was far from what the framers of the Constitution originally envisioned.   
Finally, I will conclude that National Security Strategy did not rate the 
importance of its three core missions of “Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now,” leaving 
some ambiguity as to which mission was the most important in preparing the Army for 
the requirements of the 21st century.  I will argue that the September 11, 2002 attacks 
make it a moot debate.  I will recommend a course of action for the Army to return to its 
historical roots; namely to make Homeland Security a primary federal mission of the 
National Guard, alongside its Constitutional mission as a “strategic reserve.”  This 
includes resourcing the Guard with the requisite equipment, training, and funds, as well 
as restructuring the National Guard’s ratio of combat, combat support, and combat 
service support units to successfully execute both missions.  These recommendations will 
strengthen the constitutional role of the National Guard, and allow the Army to fully 
 execute the requirements of National Military Strategy. 
 7
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 II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE RESERVE AND 
NATIONAL GUARD 
 
The scope of this thesis primarily concerns the roles and missions of the Army 
National Guard in the modern era, and how it will respond to the requirements of the 21st 
century national security environment.  This chapter will review the organization, roles, 
and missions of the active Army and its reserve components, focusing specifically on the 
Army National Guard.  I will describe the constitutional and legal underpinnings of the 
National Guard, focusing primarily on its federal mission of supporting the active Army 
during wartime, and its equally important, legally unique, “state” mission of providing 
military support to civil authorities.  I will also show that “Homeland Security” has 
always been a primary, constitutional mission for the National Guard.  This chapter will 
detail how history has shaped the relationship between the Army and the National Guard, 
and how it has led to the force structure we know today.   
The intent of this chapter is to describe the similarities and explain the differences 
between the three components of the Army, and document their historical roots.  This 
will lead to a better understanding of the arguments proposed in later chapters concerning 
the increased use of National Guard forces for overseas deployments, and the 
requirement to re-emphasize homeland security as a primary mission of the National 
Guard.  By documenting the legal framework, structure, and missions of each component, 
I hope to lay the groundwork for a better understanding of the capabilities and limitations 
of the Army, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard in transforming into a 
“Total Force” to respond to the threats to national security in the 21st century.  
A.  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Since its founding, the United States has a relied upon a combination of full-time 
“regulars” and part-time “citizen soldiers” to defend its freedom.4  The singularly unique 
structure of an active duty Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard traces its 
                                                 
4 Each branch of the US military has its “reserve” counterpart.  The US Navy (USN) and US Marine Corps (USMC) 
have the Naval and Marine Corps Reserves (USNR and USMCR), while the US Army (USA) and the US Air Force 
(USAF) have their official reserve units (USAR and USAFR) as well as an additional reserve component, the Army 
National Guard (ARNG) and the Air National Guard (ANG).  
 9
 roots to the regular, volunteer, and militia forces that were present during the nation’s 
struggle for independence.  This design was the result of our founding fathers’ purposeful 
attempts to place a system of checks and balances on the military.  They attempted to 
ensure that any military force would remain under civilian control while simultaneously 
providing for the common defense.  
Today’s active-duty Army traces its roots to the “regular” or standing Army 
established during the War for Independence, and is comprised of individuals who elect 
to make a career out of service to the nation.  The Army Reserve is descended originally 
from “volunteer” units that were founded during the colonial era.  The “volunteer” units 
differed from the militia, in that regular units of the Continental Army were created and 
filled with volunteers.  Today’s Army Reserve is comprised of “citizen soldiers” who are 
civilians except for one weekend a month and two weeks per year.  The Army Reserve 
can be mobilized at the behest of the President in times of war or national emergency, 
and falls directly under the operational control of the Army5.   
The National Guard, meanwhile, is the oldest organization of the three, and can 
trace its roots to the first militia units formed in 1636.  These militia units began as 
collective security organizations designed to provide protection for the colonial settlers.  
Every able-bodied citizen was expected to serve in the militia for common defense.  The 
militia’s main mission was to defend the population from attack, and respond to 
emergencies.  As the colonies developed, the militia expanded and came under the 
control of the individual state Governors.  This element of state control exists to this day, 
and is what distinguishes the Army National Guard citizen soldier from his Army 
Reserve counterpart6.   
Whereas the Army Reserve has purely a federal mission, and falls under the 
control of the Army, the National Guard has a unique “dual” mission: It can be activated 
by the Governor of each state to respond to state emergencies and to provide military 
support to civil authorities.  Usually, “State” Active Duty is performed in support of 
                                                 
5 “Composition and Capabilities of the Army Reserve, Overview,” available online at http://www.army.mil/usar , 
“About Us,” page 2.  Accessed 14 October 2002.  
6 “Constitutional Charter of the Guard,” page 1, available online at http://www.arng.army.mil/history/Constitution . 
Accessed 14 October 2002.  
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 disaster relief operations, such as responding to hurricanes, floods, and fires.  The Guard 
may also be called out to quell local disturbances and keep the peace.  This mission is 
also unique by law.  In 1878, Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibited 
the deployment of federal troops against civilians for the purpose of law enforcement. 
The Act provides that: “…it shall not be lawful to employ any part of the Army of the 
United States…for the purpose of executing the laws…”7 
Codified today in 18 United States Code, Section 1385, it applies only to federal forces, 
to include the National Guard when activated under Title 10.  However, Posse Comitatus 
does not apply to the National Guard when training in Title 32 status, or activated by 
state Governors for local emergencies.8  This distinction is key, and limits U.S. military 
response to domestic emergencies to those units available from the National Guard.  To 
illustrate this point more clearly, the National Guard can be activated immediately by 
Governors of each state to perform disaster relief missions such as hurricane and flood 
relief, and to fight forest fires.  The Guard performs this disaster relief under Title 32 
“state active duty” status, and is paid through state funds.  A co-located Army Reserve 
unit, because it is a federal, Title 10 asset, must go through a long chain of approval to 
the cabinet and the President before it can be mobilized to respond.  In addition, it must 
meet stringent federal requirements to ensure that is not involved in any type of law 
enforcement action commensurate with Posse Comitatus guidelines.9    
The National Guard, like the Army Reserve, also has the primary federal mission 
of providing combat ready forces to support the active Army, and is considered a 
“strategic reserve.”  The current role for the National Guard in supporting national 
security is described in Title 32, US Code, Section 102, “General Policy”: 
In accordance with the traditional military policy of the United States, it is 
essential that the strength and organization of the Army National Guard 
                                                 
7 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement 2001, Appendix A, “Constitutional Charter of the Guard,” available online 
at http://www.arng.ngb.army.mil/home/statements/ps/2001/appendixaps2001.htm. Accessed 11 April 2001. 
8 Purpose statement, “A National Guard Frontier for the Next Century,” available online at 
http://www.arng.ngb.army.mil/home/statements/nextcentury/purpose.htm.  Accessed 9 June 2000. 
9 Refer to Army Field Manual 100-19, “Domestic Support Operations,” Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
Washington, D.C., 1 July 1993.  Available online at http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/100-
19/fm10019.htm . Accessed 14 October 2002. 
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 and Air National Guard as an integral part of the first line of defenses of 
the United States be maintained and assured at all times.  Whenever 
Congress determines that more units and organizations are needed for the 
national security than are in the regular components of the ground and air 
forces, the Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National 
Guard of the United States…shall be ordered to active Federal duty and 
retained so long as needed.10 
 
However, the process for mobilizing the National Guard is more complex than 
mobilizing the active Army, and requires that the President declare a state of “war or 
national emergency” to mobilize the National Guard for deployment.  Even though it is 
provided with federal equipment and funding for training and OPTEMPO, the National 
Guard is, by design, still a state force.   
B.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARADIGM:  
No rational discussion of reserve force utilization can be conducted without a firm 
grasp of the nature and history of our military forces, and the official guidelines for their 
employment.  In the case of the US Army, this means understanding the key pieces of 
federal legislation that have established the structure and relationship between the active 
and reserve components, and the laws concerning mobilization.   
The United States Constitution provides the framework and basis for how our 
military was formed, and how it would be organized and utilized to defend the nation 
against enemies.  In the spring of 1787, during the Constitutional Convention in 
Philadelphia, the framers of the Constitution reached a compromise between the 
viewpoints of the federalists and anti-federalists in establishing a military organization 
that “…would protect liberty…without destroying… it in the process.”11  The federalists 
pushed for a strong central government, and wanted a large force of “regulars,” with state 
militias firmly under the control of the federal government.  Mindful of the recent 
experiences under the British Regular Army during the struggle for independence, the 
                                                 
10 Major General (Ret) Don Edwards and Colonel (Ret) Richard Dunn, “The National Guard’s Enhanced Role in 
Homeland Security”, available online at http://www.homelanddefense.org/journal/Articles/Edwards_Dunn.htm, page 
2. Accessed 10 April 2001. 
11 History of the Army National Guard, available online at http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/aboutng/history/det_hist/chap1.htm. 
Accessed 9 June 2000. 
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 anti-federalists were fearful of a large standing Army with dubious political ties.  The 
anti-federalists pushed for a small regular force, and a large militia under state control.   
In the end, a compromise was struck that remedied what all of the framers 
considered “…deep, structural flaws in the ability of government under the Articles of 
Confederation to defend the United States, (chiefly) the inability of the central 
government to mount and sustain military operations.”12  The result of this compromise is 
contained in Article I, Section 8, and Clauses 14, 15, and 16 of the Constitution of the 
United States.   
These documents define both the structure of our military forces, and the 
processes by which they are governed and employed.  Essentially, the framers established 
a military organization comprised of a small standing Army under federal control, and a 
large militia “reserve” that fell under state control during peacetime, and federal control 
in times of war.  This organization is the basic building block for our military.   
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution granted Congress the power to “provide 
for the common defense of the United States…declare war…raise and support 
Armies…make rules for the government and regulation of land forces… (and) provide 
for organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia… (and) to call forth the Militia to 
execute the laws of the Union.”13  This article firmly established civilian control over the 
military by having Congress determine what the size, force structure, and missions of the 
different components of the military would be.   
Clauses 14, 15 and 16, commonly known as the “Militia Clauses,” established the 
constitutional grounds for calling up the state militias for federal service.  Clause 14 
allowed Congress to call up the militia under three contingencies: “to execute the laws of 
the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.”14  In very specific terms, the 
militia forces were to be mobilized and put under federal control only in extreme 
circumstances.  Clause 15 further established boundaries between the active Army and 
                                                 
12 Richard H Kohn, The United States Military Under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989 (New York 
University Press, New York, NY, 1991) page 65. 
13 Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the united States of America, available online at 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/constitution/art1.html, accessed 31 May 2001. 
14 History of the Army National Guard; Appendix B: Constitutional Charter of the Guard, available online at 
http://www.arng.ngb..army.mil/home/statements/ps/2000/AppendB.htm, page 1.  Accessed 9 June 2000. 
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 the militia, giving Congress (and not the Army) the power to “provide for organizing, 
arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be 
employed in the service of the United States.”15  This clause also reserved the right of the 
states to establish a state militia, and put strict limits on federal control over the militia 
during peacetime. 
Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution expands on the authority of the Congress 
and the militia to respond to emergencies, specifically to defend the homeland:  “The 
United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a Republican form of 
government…and shall protect each of them…against domestic violence.”16  This section 
establishes the primary role of the militia to defend the homeland.  
The importance of the militia in guaranteeing the freedom of the new nation was 
also stressed in the Second Amendment.  The anti-federalists ensured that the federal 
government could not disarm the militia by stating, “A well regulated militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, 
shall not be infringed.”17   
The organization of the military into a small standing force and a large militia was 
unique to our nation, and created some unique problems.  The active Army would have to 
go through Congress and the respective state Governors to mobilize and employ the 
militia forces in times of war.  However, the states were satisfied, because they had a 
militia that was constitutionally responsible for providing for the common defense, and 
could be called out by the Governor to respond to state emergencies.  This created a 
control issue over the employment, organization, and readiness of the militias during 
times of war that the active Army fought hard to change.  They wanted a manpower 
reserve that they could call upon at any time, and wanted strict control over the size, 
organization, and training of the militia forces.  Throughout the last two centuries, 
                                                 
15 History of the Army National Guard; Appendix B: Constitutional Charter of the Guard, available online at 
http://www.arng.ngb..army.mil/home/statements/ps/2000/AppendB.htm, page 1.  Accessed 9 June 2000. 
16 Eric V. Larsen, John E. Peters, “Preparing the US Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues and Options.”  
RAND Corporation Study, ISBN: 0-8330-2919-3, 2001, page 6. Available online at 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1251.pdf.  Accessed 11 April 2001. 
17 US Constitution, Amendment II. Available online at http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution.billofrights.html . 
Accessed 14 October 2002. 
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 legislation has been enacted at the urging of the active Army that has changed the role 
and organization of the militia, but never eliminated the fundamental element of state 
control.   
C.  OTHER LEGISLATION AFFECTING THE RESERVE COMPONENTS: 
In 1792, the Militia Act was passed by Congress, which essentially redefined the 
relationship of the militia to the federal government.  It required every “able-bodied… 
citizen between 18 and 45” to serve in the militia, and it called for the “organization of 
the militia into (standardized) divisions, brigades, and regiments, battalions and 
companies.18  The active Army was finally able to institute some measure of 
standardization over the various militia organizations in each state.  This Militia Act 
remained on the books for 111 years.  The active Army, distrustful of the militia due to 
its strong state ties, attempted to abolish it in favor of a “national reserve” directly under 
Army control.  Once again, a balance was struck.  The Dick Act of 1903 “reaffirmed the 
(state) militias as the Army’s primary organized reserve,”19 but it also increased federal 
control over each state’s militia forces by subjecting them to regular inspections by the 
Army, and specifying unit strengths.  It provided for federal funds to outfit and equip the 
militia, and required militiamen to attend 24 drills and 5 days of Annual Training per 
year.  In essence, the Army’s attempt to create a large manpower reserve directly under 
its control were thwarted once again, and it had to continue to rely upon the state militias 
for trained manpower in times of war.  However, the Dick Act afforded more federal 
control over how the militias were organized and trained.  By utilizing federal funds, the 
Army could ensure a minimum standard for training and organization of the militia.  
In 1914, when World War I erupted in Europe, the preparedness of our armed 
forces was called into question.  The active Army argued before Congress once again to 
abolish the militia in favor of a “continental army” without state ties, complaining that 
the individual state militias were impossible to mobilize and control.  However, the fear 
                                                 
18 Morris J. MacGregor, Jr.,“The Formative Years, 1783-1812,” reprinted from American Military History, Army 
Historical Series, Chapter 5. Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army. Available online at 
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/AMH/AMH-05.htm . Accessed 14 October 2002. 
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 of a large standing army, and the resistance to funding such a large ground force were 
strong.  The result of this debate was the National Defense Act of 1916.  The act 
“guaranteed the state militias as the Army’s primary reserve force,” and mandated the 
term “National Guard” be used for all state militia organizations.20  In a compromise with 
the active component, more control over this newly coined “National Guard” was given 
to the Army.  First of all, qualifications for National Guard officers, a big bone of 
contention with the active Army, were passed to the War Department.  Secondly, the act 
called for all units to be federally recognized, and structured according to official Army 
Tables of Organization and Equipment.  Finally, the act gave the President the authority 
to mobilize the National Guard for the “duration” in cases of war or national 
emergency.21   
President Woodrow Wilson exercised this provision almost immediately when he 
called up the entire National Guard, all 158,000 members, to protect the southern border 
of the United States from attacks by Pancho Villa.  In 1917, the effectiveness of the 
National Defense Act provisions were put to the test again when the United States 
declared war on Germany.  National Guard divisions were mobilized again for the 
duration of the conflict, and made up 40 percent of the American Expeditionary Force.22  
The years between World War I and II saw two more pieces of landmark 
legislation concerning the National Guard.  The National Defense Act of 1920 
established that a National Guard officer would be the Chief of the Militia Bureau, and 
further integrated the components by assigning National Guard officers to the active 
Army’s General Staff.  The Congressional Act of 1933 officially made the National 
Guard a component of the United States Army.  This allowed the President to activate the 
Guard whenever Congress declared a national emergency, and is significant because it 
                                                                                                                                     
19 History of the Army National Guard, Chapter 8, page 2. Available online at 
http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/aboutng/history/det_hist/chap8.htm. Accessed 9 June 2000. 
20 History of the Army National Guard, Chapter 8, page 2. Available online at 
http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/aboutng/history/det_hist/chap8.htm. Accessed 9 June 2000. 
21History of the Army National Guard, Chapter 8, page 2. Available online at 
http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/aboutng/history/det_hist/chap8.htm. Accessed 9 June 2000.  
22  National Guard Posture Statement, Fiscal Year 2000, Appendix A: Army National Guard History, page 3, available 
online at http://www.arng.ngb.army.mil/home/statements/ps/2000/AppendA.htm, accessed 12 June 2000.  
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 finally took the state Governors out of the loop in assigning a federal mission to the 
National Guard.23 
The Second World War ushered in a period of profound change for the military, 
particularly its reliance upon the National Guard as a strategic reserve of manpower.  
Even though all 18 divisions of the National Guard saw combat in both Pacific and 
European theatres, it was not enough.  President Roosevelt instituted the nation’s first 
peacetime draft in 1940, which remained in effect until 1973.  By providing a constant 
source of manpower for the military through mandatory conscription, the Army’s 
reliance on the National Guard as a strategic reserve dwindled.  So too did funding for 
personnel and equipment.  Despite mobilizing over 138,000 Guardsmen in 1950 to 
respond to the Korean War, the Cold War Era saw a decline in both force structure and 
relevance for the National Guard.   
D.  THE RISE OF THE ARMY RESERVES: 
Following the Korean War, Congress passed the sweeping “Reserve Forces Act” 
of 1955.  This act was significant because it established the Army Reserve as a primary 
source of manpower for the Army, and increased their share of the defense budget at the 
expense of the National Guard.24  The Army, it seemed, had finally won the battle to 
establish a reserve force that it had direct control over.   The utility of the National Guard 
as a strategic reserve dwindled even further in the 1960’s when Robert S. McNamara, 
President Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense, targeted the National Guard for major cuts in 
manpower.  In an effort to reduce costs and streamline the military, 802 units, including 
four divisions, were cut from the Army National Guard.25  As the sixties progressed, 
President Johnson made the fateful decision not to mobilize the National Guard to fight 
the Vietnam War.  He opted instead to rely on the existing mandatory conscription laws 
to fulfill the manpower requirements for combating the North Vietnamese.  Because of 
                                                 
23 Detailed History of the National Guard, Chapter 10: “The Years Between the Wars,” available online at 
http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/aboutng/history/det_hist/chap10.htm, page 1. Accessed 9 June 2000. 
24 Detailed History of the Army National Guard, Chapter 13: “Decades of Change”, page 1.  Available online at 
http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/aboutng/history/det_hist/chap13.htm.  Accessed 9 June 2000.. 
25 Detailed History of the Army National Guard, Chapter 13: “Decades of Change”, page 1.  Available online at 
http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/aboutng/history/det_hist/chap13.htm.  Accessed 9 June 2000. 
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 the declining relevance of the National Guard in US military strategy, further cuts were 
inflicted.  By 1967, an additional 12 infantry and 3 armored divisions were inactivated.26  
The Army National Guard had dwindled down to 8 divisions: 5 Infantry, 1 Mechanized, 
and 2 Armored.   The reliance of the Army on the National Guard for a strategic 
manpower reserve had been circumvented by mandatory conscription laws and the 
increased funding and relevance of the Army Reserve.  The Army, it seemed, had won 
the long-standing fight over its control of the strategic reserves.  
The results of this policy were to have drastic impacts on the popularity of the 
Army and the government during the Vietnam War.  By eliminating the National Guard 
in its strategic planning, the Army ignored one crucial aspect of the military that the 
founding fathers understood: the National Guard’s key role as an indicator of national 
will.  Realizing the importance of the National Guard as an indicator of public support, 
the military announced a major shift in policy after Vietnam.   
E.  TOTAL FORCE POLICY: 
Due largely to the unpopularity of the Vietnam conflict and the public outcry 
against mandatory conscription, the military abolished the draft in 1973 and created an 
“all-volunteer” force.  It seemed that military planners finally understood the link 
between the National Guard and grass roots public support.  The ‘Total Force’ policy of 
1973 was designed to gain popular support for military operations from the American 
public by mobilizing the National Guard from its thousands of locations across the 
United States when needed.27  Military planners finally realized that the National Guard 
was truly a “community” force, and a reflector of national will.  The same holds true 
today.  In 1998, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre made the following remarks: 
 …The Army needs the Guard because the Army doesn’t touch 
America, the Guard touches America…When the Army was sent off the 
7th of August [1991] to Desert Storm, the Army went to war, but America 
                                                 
26 Detailed History of the Army National Guard, Chapter 13: “Decades of Change”, page 1.  Available online at 
http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/aboutng/history/det_hist/chap13.htm.  Accessed 9 June 2000. 
27 National Guard Posture Statement, FY 2000, Appendix B: “Constitutional Charter of the Guard,” page 3, available 
online at http://www.arng.ngb.army.mil/home/statements/ps/2000/AppendB.htm accessed 6/9/00. 
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 didn’t.  America went to war when all those moms and dads were on the 
courthouse lawn, saying goodbye to their Guardsmen…28  
 
Today, the National Guard is spread across 3200 Army National Guard Facilities 
and 88 Air National Guard Bases in 2700 communities across all 54 states and territories. 
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A  C om m unity- B ased Force
3200 AR N G  F acilities,       88 AN G  B ases,   2700 C om m unities
Figure 1: The National Guard.29 
The “Total Force” policy re-emphasized the importance of the National Guard as 
a strategic reserve.  It mandated that all active and reserve military organizations be 
treated as a single, integrated force.  By the mid-1970’s, the “Total Force” policy resulted 
in more Army National Guard missions, equipment, and training opportunities than ever 
before.  The Army Reserve and the National Guard were being integrated into planning 
and training at an unprecedented level.  When President Reagan was elected in 1980, he 
boosted the funding levels of our military tremendously.  By 1983, military expenditures 
                                                 
28 John Hamre, speech, “Changing Role of the Guard,” Defense Issues, volume 13, number 9, page 2.  Available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1998/s19980203-depsecdef.mil. Accessed 11 April 2001. 
29 MSPowerpoint Slide Provided by MG Raymond F. Rees, Vice Chief, National Guard Bureau, during a briefing to 
the Naval Postgraduate School, 26 March 2000.  Slide 16. 
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 as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product reached an all time high of 6.7%30.  The 
National Guard and Reserves shared in this defense build-up, and began to see changes in 
the way they were utilized.  Today, the National guard still receives over 9.7% of the 
Army’s total budget for training and OPTEMPO.31  National Guard units were given 
specific “war traces,” and were organized as “Round Out” units attached directly to 
active duty divisions.  This established formal relationships between National Guard 
units and their active component counterparts.  During their two-week annual training 
rotations, National Guard and reserve units began to participate in major active duty 
training exercises such as “REFORGER” with their round-out units.  
Even though the National Guard and Reserves experienced a boost in funding and 
relevance during the Cold War, it is important to realize that the fundamental nature of 
the National Guard and Reserves did not change.  They were still considered a “strategic 
reserve” of manpower to be called upon only during times of war or national emergency.  
Secondly, the nature of reservists as “citizen-soldiers” differed from that of the active 
military soldier.  Reservists are by nature ordinary civilians who volunteer to be part-time 
soldiers.  As such, they face different challenges than their active component 
counterparts.  They undergo the same basic training as the active army (nine weeks), 
followed by advanced training anywhere from five to 22 weeks, and become qualified in 
a military occupational specialty.  Reserve and Guard officers graduate from the college-
level Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and attend a nine to 12 week Officer 
Basic Course (OBC).  Reservists then serve one weekend per month in a drill status, and 
perform two weeks of active duty “Annual Training” per year.  For most citizen soldiers, 
this was “a commitment that was almost unnoticed by employers and only a slight 
inconvenience to civilian businesses.”32  Recognizing these unique contributions of 
Reservists and Guardsmen, legislation was enacted in 1973 along with the “Total Force” 
policy that protected the reservists’ civilian jobs while they were performing military 
                                                 
30 Alfred Stepan, “Rethinking Military Politics, Brazil and the Southern Cone.” (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ, 1988).  Table 6.5, “Military Expenditures as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product for Brazil and the 
Major Non-Latin American Democracies, 1976-1985, page 78. 
31 Refer to Appendix A, Figure 6. 
32 National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) White Paper, “Optimizing Utilization 
of a Shared Workforce: Ensuring Employer Support for the Reserve Components,” 09/2000,p 1. 
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 duty.  A national committee was established to provide support to civilian employers and 
reservists, and help mediate disputes.  This committee is known familiarly among 
reservists as ESGR, or Employer Support of the Guard and Reserves.     
F.  CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have discussed the constitutional basis for the Army, the Army 
Reserve, and the Army National Guard, and described the historical context in which 
each component was forged.  The main point of this chapter, in the context of 
determining the roles and missions of the National Guard in the 21st Century, is that the 
National Guard is, by law, a strategic reserve of trained military manpower to be called 
upon in times of war or national emergency.  The National Guard is a unique institution 
in that it is a military force with two specific missions:  First, to provide trained combat 
units to defend the country in times of war;  Secondly, it is a military organization that 
provides for the common defense of its respective state, and has the primary domestic 
mission of homeland security.  Above all, the National Guard is an organization 
comprised of “citizen soldiers.”  These soldiers are civilians who have volunteered for 
military duty as a second career, and have unique requirements.  The last two centuries 
have witnessed many changes in the utilization and relevance of the National Guard, but 
its fundamental nature has remained unchanged. 
 21
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 III. EFFECTS OF THE POST-COLD WAR ERA ON THE 
ROLE OF THE RESERVE AND THE NATIONAL GUARD 
This chapter will describe the major changes to the global security environment 
over the past decade, and its profound effects on the utilization of the Reserves and 
National Guard.  Basically, I will document the change in National Military Strategy 
from one of “deterrence” to that of “forward engagement.”  I will show how the resulting 
twenty-fold increase in deployments required to maintain a global engagement posture 
has sapped the US military’s capability to perform what it perceives as its primary 
mission: responding to two major theater wars.  The detrimental effect of performing 
repeated stability and support operations overseas has blunted the combat effectiveness 
of the Army’s 10 active component divisions.  Their readiness for combat has suffered to 
such a degree that its overall readiness to respond to a two major theater war scenario 
was called into question.  This forced the active Army to look to the National Guard and 
Reserves to help it meet operational requirements.  The global situation essentially forced 
military planners to re-assess the utilization of the National Guard and Army Reserve. 
In order to understand the fundamental changes to the employment of the Army 
National Guard and Army Reserve over the last decade, we must study the changes to the 
United States’ National Security and National Military Strategies brought on by the fall 
of the Soviet Union.  I will illustrate the realities of the 21st century security environment, 
and show the increasing demands of the “shape, respond, and prepare now” doctrine on 
the military, and contrast it with the capabilities of the existing force structure.  With the 
Army Reserve and Army National Guard now making up over 54 percent of the current 
Army force structure33, it is clear why the active Army came to the conclusion that it 
must utilize the reserves: it could not ensure both “global engagement” and combat 
readiness by itself.  For completely different reasons, The National Guard leadership 
came to the same conclusion.  With the decline of the Soviet Union, the relevance of the 
National Guard and Reserves in supporting National Military Strategy was called into 
                                                 
33 National guard Posture Statement for 2002, “Quality of Life”, Accessed on 20 April 2001 at website 
http://www.arng.ngb.army.mil/Operations/statements/ps/2002/quality_of_life2.htm.  
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 question.  The National Guard and Reserve leadership sought additional missions to 
ensure its future institutional survival.  Seeing the dilemma of the active component in 
performing the “shaping” strategy, the National Guard and Reserves latched onto these 
overseas stability and support missions as its guarantor of future relevance and funding.   
I will show how the active Army, out of necessity, and the National Guard, out of 
survival, then sought to fundamentally change the constitutional underpinnings of 
National Guard utilization.   
A.   THE COLD WAR PARADIGM 
During the Cold War, the National Guard and Reserves were considered nothing 
more than a “strategic reserve” of trained manpower.  Their primary role was to mobilize 
and deploy overseas to support the active component, in case of war in Europe or North 
Korea.  Even with the increased funding of the Reagan era, this remained the National 
Guard and Reserves’ primary mission.  In terms of the National Military Strategy of the 
Cold War era, the National Guard and Reserves were considered as conventional 
supplement to the active Army, to be utilized in a two major theater war scenario.   
Between 1950 and 1989, our Army consisted of 28 divisions: 18 were Active Army, and 
10 were in the National Guard.  During this same time frame, our military was mobilized 
only ten times, and called on to deploy overseas only seven.  These deployments filled 
the full spectrum of military conflict, from the National Guard deploying to quell riots in 
Los Angeles, Detroit, and Chicago in the 1960’s to major theater wars in Korea and 
Vietnam.  During the 1980’s, the era of the largest peacetime defense budgets in US 
history, our reserve forces numbered over 1 million personnel.  However, these reserve 
forces supported the active component at a rate of fewer than one million man-days per 
year, the equivalent of only 2,750 personnel on active duty at any given time.34 
According to Charles Cragin, the former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Reserve Affairs,  
                                                 
34 Charles L. Cragin, “Defense Leaders Commentary: Milestones on the Road to Integration,” found at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2000/n02142000_20002141.html, page 1. 
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  To serve in (the reserves) during that period meant finding oneself 
suspended in the frozen logic of the Cold War.  Such logic held that 
reserve forces were precisely that – they were kept ready in reserve, 
waiting for the advent of World War III and the cataclysmic contingency 
that would call them on the front lines in the fight against communism in 
Europe or Asia.35   
 
The constitutional role of the reserves to mobilize and deploy for its wartime 
mission had essentially remained unchanged from 1950 through 1989.  However, the 






































• Korea (1950): 64 Divisions (18 AC; 21ARNG; 25 USAR)
• Vietnam (1968): 40 Divisions (17 AC; 23 ARNG)
• Cold War End (1989): 28 Divisions (18 AC; 10 ARNG)
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Figure 2.  “The Geostrategic Environment, 1950-1989.”36 
                                                 
35 Charles L. Cragin, “Defense Leaders Commentary: Milestones on the Road to Integration,” found at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2000/n02142000_20002141.html, page 1. 
36 Slide part of the “ Aviation Force Structure into the 21st Century” briefing provided by CPT Jeff Janey, US Army 
Aviation Warfighting Center, 24 August 2000, slide 5. 
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 B.   THE POST-COLD WAR PARADIGM 
Due to the profound changes in the international security environment with the 
fall of the Soviet Union, coupled with the impacts of the “revolution in military affairs,” 
the period between 1989 and the present day has witnessed a fundamental change to the 
utilization of our National Guard and Reserve forces.  The following excerpt from a New 
York Times article highlights the growing trend of all branches of the military to deploy 
Reserve and National Guard soldiers overseas to perform small-scale contingency 
operations in support of National Military and National Security Strategy:   
The Army, like the other armed services, is increasingly relying on the 
National Guard to supplement active-duty soldiers in military 
operations…and announced today (4 December 2000) that it would 
effectively turn over its mission in Bosnia to part-time National Guard 
soldiers…By late 2002, the peacekeeping mission is to be commanded 
exclusively in six-month rotations by troops from the eight National 
Guard divisions.37  
 
The primary reason for the increased employment of reserve soldiers and units for 
operations overseas is to “mitigate the effects of high operational tempo and better 
sustain the Army’s overall level of readiness…”38  In simple terms, without deploying 
Army Reserve and National Guard forces overseas to perform peace operations, 
humanitarian interventions, and other stability and support operations, the active-duty 
Army can not maintain the readiness to fulfill its primary combat mission: Respond with 
overwhelming superiority to two “nearly simultaneous” major theater wars.    
Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinsecki, upon taking office in 1999, 
aggressively reinforced the Department of Defense’s “Total Force” policy.  In integrating 
the National Guard and Reserves into the Army’s strategy of global engagement, he 
stated: “Today, I declare that we are ‘THE Army,’ totally integrated with a unity of 
                                                 
37 Myers, Steven Lee, “Army Will Give National Guard The Entire U.S. Role in Bosnia,” New York Times 
International, December 4, 2000, Page 1. 
38 Major Thomas Artis, Spokesman for the Army, as quoted by Steven Lee Myers in “Army Will Give National Guard 
The Entire U.S. Role in Bosnia,” New York Times International, December 4 2000, Page 1. 
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 purpose – No longer the ‘Total Army’, no longer “One Army.’  We are ‘THE Army,’ and 
we will march into the 21st century as ‘THE Army.’” 39   
While this integration has made landmark strides in eliminating intra-service 
competition for relevance and funding, and reduced the operational tempo of the active 
force, it marked a drastic shift in the constitutional underpinnings of the nation’s reserve 
forces.  On any given day since this policy went into effect, the United States has had 
over 35,000 reserve and National Guard soldiers deployed overseas in direct support of 
overseas missions, the manpower equivalent of adding two Army divisions to our active 
duty end-strength.40  It is important to note that these deployed reservists are performing 
peacekeeping and stability / support missions as part of the National Military Strategy of 
“shaping” the global security environment.  These reservists have been involuntarily 
mobilized for a purpose not expressly covered by the Constitution.  In short, these forces 
have been deployed without the declaration of war or national emergency.    
Today’s military has been shaped by two powerful influences: The first influence 
was domestic pressure for force reduction due to the end of the Cold War.  The 6.7 
percent of gross domestic product expended on defense during the Reagan era could not 
be maintained.  President Reagan successfully bankrupted the “evil empire” by forcing 
them to into an arms race they could not sustain.  However, continued spending at that 
rate would also threaten the United States’ own stability.  During the 1990’s, the US 
embarked on a large-scale draw down of the military in an attempt to realize the “peace 
dividend” provided by the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Spending decreased 
dramatically.  In fiscal year 1998, the Department of Defense budget was in real terms 
nearly 37 below its peak level in 1985.  In 2000, defense expenditure was only 2.9 
percent of gross domestic product.41  Total US military force structure decreased by 
                                                 
39   Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinsecki, As quoted by the Honorable Charles L. Cragin, “Defense Leaders 
Commentary: Milestones on the Road to Integration.”  Available online at: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2000/n02142000_20002141.html, page 8.  Accessed 21 April 2001. 
40 The Honorable  Charles L. Cragin, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs,  “Defense 
Leaders Commentary: Milestones on the Road to Integration,” available online at: http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-
bin/dlprint.cgi, page 2.  Accessed 20 April 2001. 
41 William S. Cohen, 2001 Annual Report to the President and Congress, Chapter 17, The 2002 Defense Budget, 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr2001/chapter17.pdk. accessed 20 April 2001.  
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 about one-third.  While that may not seem drastic, especially in relation to the “century of 
peace” prophesied by some, it is important to realize that the demographics of the force 
changed significantly.  The National Guard retained its 8 divisions, while the active 
Army reduced in size from 18 divisions to 10.  Today, over fifty-four percent of all Army 
combat forces are in the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard.42  That means the 
majority of our available military manpower is in the form of citizen-soldiers.  The graph 
below depicts the current Army demographics by percentages of the total force.  
Concurrent with these reductions in force, a second major influence increased the 
rate of employment of US armed forces: the changing international security environment.  
In the era of globalization, the US would play a primary role in maintaining the world’s 
political and economic stability.  The scope of our national security interests changed, 
and with it, the nature of our doctrine.  In 1996 and 1997, new National Security and 
National  
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42 Charles L. Cragin, Page 1. 
43 Slide part of the “ National Guard” briefing presented to the Naval Postgraduate School by Major General Raymond 
F. Rees, Vice Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 9 March 2000. 
  
 
Military Strategies were published, calling on the US military to “Shape” the 
international security environment, “Respond” to crises, and “Prepare Now” for any 
contingency.44  The US Army’s version of this doctrine, known as “The Army Vision: 
Soldiers on Point for the Nation,” calls on our ground forces to be “Persuasive in Peace,” 
and “Invincible in War.”45  “Persuasive in Peace” specifies that the Army will be relied 
upon to resolve the ever-increasing number of inter-state and intra-state conflicts around 
the globe.  By performing disaster relief, humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, peace 
enforcement, peacemaking, and humanitarian intervention missions, to name just a few, 
the US hopes to shape the international environment by promoting peace and ensuring 
the stability of free-market economies.  Should these efforts fail, the US military is 
expected to protect national security interests by maintaining the capability to be 
“Invincible in War.”   
Specifically, this part of our strategy requires the US Army to maintain the 
combat capability to respond with overwhelming force to conflicts in two separate areas 
of the world (known familiarly as the two major theater war scenario). It was expected 
that the proposed active-duty force levels for the post-Cold War era would be more than 
adequate to support our doctrine of global engagement.   
Unfortunately, the capability of our military perform these types of missions was 
fundamentally misunderstood, and the requirements for global involvement grossly 
underestimated.  This miscalculation, coupled with the current demographics of the 
armed forces, has led to the current deployment of 35,000 reservists overseas in 77 
countries throughout the world.46  In short, the decreasing active component force 
structure and increasing global requirements have forced military planners to call upon 
the National Guard and Reserves to ensure global stability.  
                                                 
44 1997 National Military Strategy, available online at http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/nms1997.htm Accessed 20 April 2001. 
45 “The Army Vision, Soldier’s On Point for the Nation,” Title Page, available online at 
http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/armyuvision/title.htm  Accessed 26 March 2000.  
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 C.    THE INCREASING REQUIREMENT FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD 
AND RESERVES IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY 
  There are three primary reasons for the increased use of the National Guard and 
Reserves to help “The Army” execute the requirements of National Military Strategy:  
First, there is a growing divergence between military capabilities and the operational 
requirements to execute National Military Strategy; Second, the impacts of performing 
stability and support operations on combat readiness were grossly misjudged; Last but 
not least, the increasing the use of reservists became a means of institutional survival for 
the National Guard and Reserve components. 
First, there is a mismatch between the requirements of the Post-Cold War security 
environment and the capabilities of the active-duty military force designed to execute 
them.  In particular, deploying overseas on an ever-increasing number of small scale 
contingency operations has had an adverse impact on the active-duty military’s ability to 
fight large scale wars.  Instead of the expected era of peace, the post-Cold War years 
have been marked by an unprecedented number of inter-state and intra-state conflicts.  
Richard N. Haass concludes, 
On balance, the post-Cold War world promises to be a messy one where 
violence is common, where conflicts within and between nation-states 
abound, and where the question of U.S. military intervention becomes 
more rather than less commonplace, and more rather than less 
complicated.47   
 
As a result, our military deployments overseas have increased dramatically.  The 
Employer Support of the Guard and Reserves organization (ESGR) notes that the 
“…operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of the Army is now 20 times higher than during the 
Cold War.”48  The simple fact is that the ability of the US military to “Shape” the global 
environment through stability and support operations has been so successful over the past 
                                                                                                                                     
46 2000 Financial Report of the Army, available online at 
http://www.arng.ngb.army.mil/Operations/statements/FinReport2000/an_overview_3.htm. Accessed 20 April 2001. 
47 Richard N. Haass, “Intervention, The Use of American Military Force In The Post-Cold War World” (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 1999) page 2. 
48 2000 Financial Report of the Army, accessed 20 April 2001 at 
http://www.arng.ngb.army.mil/Operations/statements/FinReport2000/an_overview_3.htm.   
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 decade that the demand for this service has exploded.  The US Army, former Army Chief 
of Staff Dennis Reimer remarked, “…has become the 911 force for the global village.”49  
The sheer level of military involvement in peacekeeping operations and 
humanitarian interventions has far surpassed anything force planners ever intended.  The 
force structure levels agreed upon by military and civilian experts after the end of the 
Cold War was sufficiently large to ensure the successful resolution of two major regional 
conflicts.  However, this force structure was not adequate to perform that mission and 
deploy on countless numbers of peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions.   
The slide below demonstrates the remarkable number of deployments the military 






































































































• Cold War End (1989): 28 Divisions (18 AC;10 ARNG)
• Today (1999): 18 Divisions (10 AC; 8 ARNG)
Figure 4. “The Geostrategic Environment, 1989-1999.”50 
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49 Army Chief of Staff Dennis J. Reimer, as quoted by Philip Gold in “The Essentials of Self Preservation; What Our 
Military Can’t live Without,” The Heritage Foundation Policy Review, December 2000 / January 2001, page 37. 
 The ever-increasing number of deployments depicted above leads directly to the 
second point: The side effects of performing peacekeeping and humanitarian 
interventions were largely misunderstood when the post-Cold War force structure was 
designed.  These “Military Operations Other Than War” (MOOTW), are costly, often 
long (or unending) in duration, and generate an enormous drain on manpower and 
readiness.  Combined, these factors have a documented adverse impact on the fighting 
capability of the forces deployed.  “Experience (has) revealed…that relief and 
peacekeeping operations were …money-losers and that they blunted and exhausted 
combat units.”51   
In today’s highly specialized and sophisticated military machine, this equates to a 
loss of combat capability.  On 26 October 1999, two of the US Army’s active duty units, 
the 10th Mountain Division and the 1st Infantry Division, both reported lower than normal 
combat readiness ratings.52  This was a direct result of their recent deployments to Bosnia 
and Kosovo.  It took these divisions almost 120 days to retrain and report normal 
readiness levels.53  
Recent experience has proven that stability and support operations require the 
commitment of at least three units to keep one unit deployed.54  Much like the Navy 
mantra of “It takes three carriers to keep one on station,” military operations other than 
war usually require that one unit be in training, one unit be on station, and one unit be 
retraining for its wartime mission.   
This increased operational tempo, and its resulting effects on combat readiness 
were fundamentally misunderstood by governmental decision makers during the draw 
                                                                                                                                     
50 Slide part of the “ Aviation Force Structure into the 21st Century” briefing provided by CPT Jeff Janey, US Army 
Aviation Warfighting Center, 24 August 2000, slide 6. 
51 Philip Gold, “The Essentials of Self Preservation; What Our Military Can’t Live Without,”  The Heritage 
Foundation Policy Review, December 2000/January 2001, page 36. 
52 Background Briefing on Army Readiness, November 10, 1999.  Available online at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov1999/x11101999_x1110rdy.html.  Accessed 20 April 2001. 
53 Background Briefing on Army Readiness, November 10, 1999.  Available online at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov1999/x11101999_x1110rdy.html.  Accessed 20 April 2001. 
54Background Briefing on Army Readiness, November 10, 1999.  Available online at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov1999/x11101999_x1110rdy.html.  Accessed 20 April 2001. 
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 down.  The active military force structure after the collapse of the Soviet Union was 
adequate to respond to two overlapping major theater wars; not two major conflicts and 
an untold number of contingency operations.   
Another unexpected impact of performing stability and support operations has 
been the negative effects on unit esprit dé corps.  Individuals who make a career of the 
military possess a certain warrior ethos, and this spirit suffers when personnel are forced 
to perform peacekeeping duties.  To put it plainly, “…warrior and constabulary ethics 
(victory versus peacekeeping) don’t mix…”55  Active Army units with repeated 
deployments to Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai have reported large losses in retention 
rates, especially of its younger soldiers.  These soldiers, in their exit questionnaires, point 
directly to the increased burden of deploying overseas for “non-standard” missions as the 
primary reason for leaving56. 
As the number of deployments overseas increases, the only answer, it seems, is to 
look to our reserve forces to fill the gap. “Future rotations of US peacekeeping forces… 
will require Army Guard and Reserve forces (to deploy) in large numbers for periods up 
to 179 days.  The regular Army today just does not have the personnel to complete 
these… small-scale contingency missions… while maintaining a readiness for large-scale 
warfare at the same time.”57  
However, the increased use of reservists for overseas stability and support 
operations was not solely implemented at the behest of the active Army.  The third reason 
for the increased deployment of National Guard and Reserve Personnel overseas was 
institutional survival.  As the Soviet Union passed away as the United States’ primary 
antagonist in world affairs, so too did the Army’s requirement for maintaining a large 
strategic reserve of manpower and equipment.  The fact is, the Army Reserve and 
National Guard leadership sought out these missions to prove their utility as a “relevant” 
                                                 
55 Philip Gold, “The Essentials of Self Preservation; What Our Military Can’t Live Without,”  The Heritage 
Foundation Policy Review, December 2000/January 2001, page 37. 
56 “Optimizing Utilization of a Shared Workforce: Ensuring Employer Support for the Reserve Components,” 
National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) White Paper, September 2000, page 1.   
57 Groves, John R, Jr., Adjutant General, Kentucky Army National Guard, “New Challenges Ahead For Kentucky’s 
Citizen Soldier’s and Airmen,” The Louisville Courier-Journal, 15 September 2000, Page 9A. 
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 component of the Army.  As the active-duty military began reporting recruiting, 
retention, and readiness issues with repeated deployments to places like Haiti, Bosnia, 
Kosovo, and the Sinai Peninsula, “…the reserve leadership embraced these overseas 
deployments as its raison d’être.”58  This was a bureaucratic survival technique employed 
to protect the National Guard and Reserve’s manpower, equipment, and operating 
budgets. 
It seemed that the active Army’s dilemma was over: it could pass small-scale 
contingency missions to National Guard and Reserve units, allowing it to concentrate on 
maintaining combat readiness for the two-major theater war scenario.  At the same time, 
the National Guard and Reserves were able to secure funding, and gain a sense of 
purpose as an integral member of the Army team.  General Shinsecki’s “THE Army” 
directive began to ring true:  National Guardsmen and Reservists were deployed overseas 
alongside their active component counterparts, executing the National Military Strategy 
of “shaping” the global security environment.  However, this increase in the utilization of 
the Army’s strategic reserves to perform military operations other than war marked a 
profound change to the constitutional charter for the National Guard and Reserves. 
D.   CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have shown how the changes in the global security landscape 
brought about by the end of the Cold War caused fundamental changes to the US 
National Security and National Military Strategies.  With the loss of a major peer 
competitor, the strategy changed from one of deterrence to one requiring global 
engagement.   
US forces would be expected to deploy overseas to prevent the escalation of 
minor conflicts into threats to our national security interests.  This equated to far more 
overseas deployments in the ten short years after the fall of the Berlin Wall than during 
the 40 years prior.  This increased requirement to mobilize and deploy overseas came at 
the same time the American population was demanding a peace dividend from the end of 
                                                 
58 James T. Currie, “Remember, They’re Not Replacements,” The Washington Post, March 25, 2001; Page B3. 
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 the Cold War.  The military was forced to downsize and reduce its force size by over one 
third.  The double blow of reduced force structure and increased deployments had a 
detrimental effect upon the active Army’s combat readiness to perform its primary 
mission of responding to two major theater wars.  The impact of  performing stability and 
support operations also had unexpected effects on readiness.  The costs, both in monetary 
and readiness terms, was grossly underestimated by military planners. 
Meanwhile, Army Reserve and National Guard planners were searching for 
relevance in the post-Cold War era.  With budget pressures forcing reductions in the size 
of the military, the strategic reserves were the first on the chopping block.  To ensure 
their continued existence and importance to the National Military Strategy, the National 
Guard and Reserves actively sought out new missions to ensure their institutional 
survival. 
The combination of these forces resulted in profound changes to the constitutional 
roles and missions of the strategic reserves.  Without deploying Army Reserve and 
National Guard forces overseas to perform peace operations, humanitarian interventions, 
and other stability and support operations, the active-duty Army could not maintain the 
readiness to fulfill its primary combat mission: Respond with overwhelming superiority 
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 IV. THE RE-EMERGENCE OF HOMELAND SECURITY AS A 
PRIMARY MISSION FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD 
 
In this chapter, I will show how the active Army fundamentally misinterpreted the 
requirements of National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy during the 
post-Cold War era.  I will show that this misinterpretation was not malicious, but 
motivated by the desire to perform what it determined to be its core mission: fight and 
win two major theater wars.  The Army jealously guarded its combat capability of ten 
active component divisions, and was determined not to repeat the mistakes made during 
previous draw-downs of the 20th century.  However, the changes to the international 
security environment posed a greater threat to domestic national security than a major 
theater war:  The threat of attack on US population, infrastructure, and government on 
domestic soil through terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction. 
Despite National Military Strategy requirements for Homeland Security59, the 
Army did not specifically incorporate it into its strategic planning for the future.  Instead 
of actively preparing for the force structure, modernization, and equipment requirements 
needed to execute the “Homeland Security” strategy, the Army doggedly stuck to the 
two-Major Theater War scenario to justify keeping what it already had.  It deemed that 
“Homeland Security” was a secondary, “State” mission of the National Guard, and that 
the mission could be executed with available resources.  The ten active component 
division force structure required to respond to two nearly simultaneous major theater 
wars was deemed the most important factor in Army future planning. 
I will begin by detailing the re-emergence of Homeland Security as a major 
planning requirement for the different services for the next century.  I will then 
document, through external reviews of Army planning and strategy for the next century 
(the 1997 and 2001 Quadrennial Defense Reviews), how the Army misinterpreted the 
requirements for Homeland Security, instead favoring a retention of the archaic two 
major theater war scenario.  Finally, I will show that the Army needs to fundamentally 
                                                 
59 The Army’s Strategic Vision specifically addresses the requirement to “Support Homeland Defense.”  Refer to 
Appendix A, Figure 7 for a graphic representation of how “Homeland Security” was a core mission of the Army. 
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 transform and fund the National Guard for the Homeland Security mission.  Paramount in 
the Army’s plans for transformation must be the roles, structures, equipment and priority 
of the National Guard to adequately perform Homeland Security.  In essence, the 
National Guard’s role in providing for national security must change back to what the 
original founders had in mind: it must defend the homeland against domestic threats. 
A.   INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS OF THREATS IN THE 21ST CENTURY   
The fall of the Soviet Union led to profound changes for the US military; some, 
like the draw down required to realize a “peace dividend” from the end of the Cold War, 
were expected.  Other changes, such as the realities of the post-Cold War security 
environment, were harder to anticipate.  Congress, in order to make informed decisions 
on future warfighting strategies and their respective budget requirements, directed the 
intelligence experts to evaluate the threats to US national security over the next twenty 
years.  The resulting evaluation of the global security landscape for the 21st century led 
to profound reformulations of our National Security Strategy.  Instead of the “deterrence” 
strategy maintained during the Cold War, the loss of the Warsaw Pact as a major peer 
competitor forced the United States into adopting a forward-deployed, “prevention” 
strategy:  If the US could intervene overseas in small disputes early enough, major 
conflicts threatening national security interests could be avoided.  This led to the 
adoption of a new, “forward engagement” National Military Strategy in 1997.  This 
strategy revolves around three core elements: First, “Shaping the International 
Environment,” which mandates that US forces prevent conflicts through “peacetime 
engagement activities;”60 Second, “Responding to the Full Spectrum of Crises,”61 which 
translates into the rapid deployment of overwhelming conventional combat power when 
conflicts erupt; and Last, “Preparing Now for an Uncertain Future.”62  This National 
Military Strategy was then adopted by each of the respective services, who then issued 
                                                 
60 1997 National Military Strategy, Executive Summary. Available online at http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/nms/executiv.htm 
. Page 1.  Accessed 14 October 2002. 
61 Ibid., page 1. 
62 Ibid., Page 1. 
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 “vision statements” for how they expected to transform their force structure, size, and 
missions to execute the new strategy.63 
The Army actively engaged in the first two requirements of the National Military 
Strategy;  It deployed overseas, at an alarming rate, to “Shape” the global environment. 
To “Respond” to crises, the Army actively fought to maintain its force structure and 
readiness.  However, the Army did not correctly analyze the “Prepare Now” portion of 
the strategy.  Instead of organizing for future asymmetric threats, the Army focused on 
the transformation and modernization of existing forces to maintain conventional military 
superiority. 
One of the major findings of the intelligence analysis of the 21st century was that 
the US would be subject to asymmetric threats to our national security.64  Due to the 
overwhelming superiority of our political, economic, and military assets, the enemies of 
the United States would understand that conventional attacks would be futile, and would 
resort to other means to attack our national security interests.  The intelligence summary 
concluded that terrorist attacks, especially those using weapons of mass destruction, were 
not only likely, but inevitable.  These attacks would concentrated on the perceived “soft 
underbelly” of the United States; namely, our civilian population.  The analysts 
concluded that that the best way to counter these threats would be to enhance the existing 
capabilities of our military to perform the mission of “Homeland Security.”  This mission 
was seen as perfectly suited for the National Guard, as it had traditionally performed the 
role of Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) and disaster relief since its 
inception.  Secondly, the “Posse Comitatus” limitations on using active component forces 
in law enforcement and domestic disputes made the National Guard a key player in the 
new mission of “Homeland Security.”65 
                                                 
63 Refer to Appendix A, Figure 7 for a graphic representation of how the US Army developed its current vision 
statement: “The Army Vision; Soldiers on Point for the Nation.” 
64 Eric V. Larsen, John E. Peters, “Preparing the US Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options.”  
RAND Corporation study ISBN: 0-8330-2919-3, 2001, Chapter 1, Page 7.  Available online at 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1251/MR1251.pdf.  Accessed 11 April 2001. 
65 Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 (RCE 05). Executive Summary, page 2.  Available online at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/rces2005_072299.html#summary.  Accessed 11 April 2001. 
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 B.   THE REBIRTH OF HOMELAND SECURITY AS A PRIMARY MISSION  
Over the last decade, “Homeland Security” has re-emerged as a primary mission 
for our military, due to the increasing threats of terrorism, cyber warfare, and the possible 
use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against our population, government, and 
economic infrastructure.  The threats to US national security in the 21st century would no 
longer be from the conventional military force of a peer competitor, at least for the next 
twenty years; future threats to national security would be asymmetric in nature.  
“Homeland Security” is the strategic plan of the government to prepare for and respond 
to such asymmetric threats.  Because the response to domestic attacks involves many 
different branches of the government, to include the Departments of Defense, 
Transportation, and local and regional disaster management agencies, Homeland Security 
has had different meanings for different organizations. 
For the military in general, and the Army specifically, “Homeland Security” is 
defined as: “… all military activities aimed at preparing for, protecting against, or 
managing the consequences of attacks on American soil, including the continental US 
and US territories and possessions.  It includes all actions to safeguard the populace and 
its property, critical infrastructure, the government and the military, its installations, and 
deploying forces.”66   
There are three key military tasks involved with Homeland Security67:   
1. Deterring and defending against foreign and domestic threats. 
2. Supporting Civil Authorities in crisis and consequence management. 
3. Ensuring the availability, integrity, and survivability of critical national 
assets.   
With this operational definition of Homeland Security in mind, we need to examine how 
it re-emerged as a priority in preserving our national security.  
                                                 
66 Eric V. Larsen, John E. Peters, “Preparing the US Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options.”  
RAND Corporation study ISBN: 0-8330-2919-3, 2001, page 22.  Available online at 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1251/MR1251.pdf.  Accessed 11 April 2001. 
67 These three task areas are my interpretation of the requirements set forth by the Phase III Report of the US 
Commission on National Security/21st Century, pages 25-26, and the five task areas delineated by Eric Larsen and 
John Peters in “Preparing the US Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, issues and Options,” page xvii. 
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 With the demise of the Soviet Union as a major antagonist in world affairs, the 
United States was thrust into a position of being the pre-eminent military and economic 
power on the globe.  Enemies of the United States, be they religious, economic, or 
ideologic in nature, would have to resort to attacking at our only perceived weak point: 
our homeland.  The fall of the Soviet Union brought about a unique threat: the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  Chemical, biological, and even nuclear 
weapons from the Soviet Armies were increasingly available to well-funded terrorist 
organizations.  Secondly, the global reach of the internet also made the technology to 
produce such weapons readily available.  Certain events over the last 10 years have lent 
credence to this increasing threat: 
• The World Trade Center bombing of 1993. 
• Timothy McVeigh’s bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in 1995. 
• The Tokyo subway attack by the Aum Shinrikyo religious sect in 1995, in which 
Sarin Nerve Gas was employed. 
• The Centennial Park bombing in Atlanta during the 1996 Olympics. 
• The bombing of the Al Khobar towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996. 
• The attacks on embassies of the United States in Nairobi and Dar-es-Saalam by 
Osama bin Laden in 1998. 68 
• The attack on the USS Cole in 2000. 
 
In January 1997, Secretary of Defense William Cohen made this remark 
concerning future threats: 
I believe the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction presents the 
greatest threat the world has ever known. We are finding more and more 
countries who are acquiring technology…and are developing chemical 
weapons and biological weapons capabilities to be used in theater and also 
on a long range basis.  So I think that is perhaps the greatest threat any of 
us will face in the coming years.69 
                                                 
68 List of events found in Eric V. Larsen, John E. Peters, “Preparing the US Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, 
Issues, and Options.”  RAND Corporation study ISBN: 0-8330-2919-3, 2001, page 2.  Available at 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1251/MR1251.pdf.  Accessed 11 April 2001. 
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69 Secretary of Defense William Cohen, as quoted in the “Department of Defense Plan for Integrating National Guard 
and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction”, prepared by the DoD 
  
Congress, to better understand the changing nature of threat to our national 
security, commissioned many investigations into the risk and consequences for such 
attacks on US soil, and the level of preparedness of our military to prevent, respond, and 
manage the consequences from such attacks.  The assessments of these reports were quite 
enlightening for military planners.  First of all, the requirement for Homeland Security 
was deemed a critical mission for the Army in general, and the Army National Guard 
specifically.  The National Defense Panel, which convened in 1997, made the following 
recommendations concerning the preparation for Homeland Security in its report 
“Meeting National Security Challenges of 2020”70:  
• Develop integrated active and passive defense measures against the employment 
of weapons of mass destruction. 
• Incorporate all levels of government into managing the consequences of a 
weapons of mass destruction attack. 
• Prepare the Reserve Components to support consequence management. 
• Equip, organize, and train the National Guard to provide general-purpose forces 
for Military Support to Civil Authorities. 
 
These recommendations were echoed in the January 31st, 2001 “Report of the US 
Commission on National Security in the 21st Century.”  Also known as the Hart / 
Rudman commission, it recommended making Homeland Security a primary federal 
mission of the National Guard, and that the Guard “should be reorganized, properly 
trained, and adequately equipped to undertake that mission.”71  
In the Army’s defense, the “Prepare Now” element of the 1997 National Military 
Strategy is somewhat vague.  Since it was published prior to the 1998 version of National 
                                                                                                                                     
“Tiger Team”, January 1998, Title page.  Available online at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/wmdresponse/index.html. Accessed 10 April 2001. 
70 National Defense Panel report, “Meeting National Security Challenges of 2020”, available online at 
http:///www.ngb.dtic.mil/referenc/briefings/wmd/NDP.htm, page 6.  Accessed 9 June 2000. 
71 Lisa Troshinsky, “Homeland Defense One of the First Initiatives of New Year”,  Navy News Week, February 12, 
2001, page 2. 
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 Security Strategy, “…(this) may account for its relative inattention to the issue of 
homeland security.”72  However, even though the 1997 National Military Strategy does 
not mention “Homeland Security” per se, it describes threats such as “asymmetric 
warfare against the United States, (where)…some state or non-state actors may resort to 
asymmetric means to counter the US military…Of special concern are terrorism, the use 
or threatened use of (weapons of mass destruction), and information warfare.”73  Clearly, 
the intent of National Military Strategy to make homeland security a primary mission of 
the military was evident.  The 1998 issue of National Security Strategy, titled “A 
National Security Strategy For a New Century,” clearly delineates the requirement for 
Homeland Security: “Weapons of mass destruction pose the greatest potential threat to 
global stability and security…the solution is…a broad, national effort that relies on 
interagency efforts at the federal level and a program that knits these federal capabilities 
together with local and state capabilities.”74  Despite the mandate to plan and prepare for 
the future mission of Homeland Security, the Army has overlooked these requirements to 
transform its force structure, size, and missions (especially those of the reserve 
component) to the realities of the post-Cold War era.  The active Army concluded that 
“Homeland Security” was a secondary, “state” mission of the National Guard that could 
be accomplished with existing assets.  It misinterpreted the “Prepare Now” element of 
National Military Strategy and focused on modernizing and transforming its current 
forces to defeat a conventional peer in the next century.     
                                                 
72 Eric V. Larsen, John E. Peters, “Preparing the US Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options.”  
RAND Corporation study ISBN: 0-8330-2919-3, 2001, Chapter 1, page 9.  Available online at 
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 C.  “NO MORE KOREAS” 
General Gordon Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army in the early 1990’s, 
preached a mantra of “no more Koreas,” and vowed to keep the United States Army 
ready for any contingency.  His reference to the Korean War was right on the mark.  
Historically, the United States Army had gone through a cycle of build-ups and 
mobilizations, followed by massive, ill-planned, and ill-executed draw downs.   
These cycles had a detrimental effect on the Army’s preparedness for combat, as 
demonstrated during the Korean War.  Within a short five years after celebrating “V-E” 
and “V-J” days, the United States Army had demobilized to such an extent that it was 
completely unprepared to fight a conventional war.  The level of training, discipline, and 
morale of US forces on the North Korean border were so poor in 1950 that the American 
Army was very nearly routed.  Once again, the nation had to resort to a general 
mobilization to draft, train, and deploy an army to stop the North Korean advance.  This 
was a great source of embarrassment for an Army that had just been victorious in the 
Second World War.  General Sullivan and the senior Army leadership vowed that the US 
Army would never again suffer such casualties from being unprepared, and that any 
future draw-downs would be intensively managed to maintain readiness.  This mantra has 
stuck in the minds of Army planners to this day, and is the primary reason the Army 
fundamentally misinterpreted the requirements of National Military Strategy to “Prepare 
Now” for future operations.   
During the initial draw-down in 1990 and 1991, the Army went from 18 active 
component, and 10 National Guard Divisions down to 10 active component and 8 
National Guard divisions.  However, after the initial rounds of Base Realignment And 
Closure (BRAC), the Army leadership continued to internally evaluate its size, force 
structure, and strategy in preparation for future debates.  In 1991, the “Base Force” 
commission was conducted, as well as the Commission On Roles and Missions (CORM).  
In 1993, an internal Army Bottom Up Review (BUR) was also conducted.  All three of 
these internal commissions concluded that 8 active component Army divisions were 
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 sufficient to meet a two-MTW threat.75  However, these reviews did not take into account 
the increasing number of deployments Army was making to shape the international 
environment, and their effect on the combat capability of the existing units.  The bottom 
line is that the active Army, because of its 20th century draw-down history, was 
determined to learn from the mistakes it made after WWII.  It was committed as an 
organization to maintain, at all costs, its combat capability to wage two major theater 
wars.  In specific terms, this meant that the Army was committed to maintaining its 10 
active component divisions at all costs, despite the requirements of National Security and 
National Military Strategy.    
D.   THE 1997 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 
The results of the externally mandated 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, and 
the following RAND Arroyo Strategic Development Center Study, clearly document that 
the Army doggedly maintained its focus on the two major theater war planning scenario 
instead of aggressively embracing “Homeland Security.”   
In 1997, the Department of Defense completed its first Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR).  This was an externally mandated bottom-up review of all services and 
military departments.  The QDR essentially reviewed how each service was planning, 
organizing, and preparing for future missions, and gave congressional visibility to the 
mindset of each service as it prepared for the future.   
There were three major reasons why Congress requested the QDR:  First and 
foremost was the change in the national security landscape.  With the fall of the Soviet 
Union, there was no longer a peer competitor that could match the economic and 
conventional military capabilities of the US.  The overwhelming victory of our 
conventional forces over Iraq during the 1991 Desert Shield/Desert Storm conflict also 
put into question the planned modernization requirements of each respective service.  
Secondly, the increasing number of engagements in “military operations other than war” 
(MOOTW), such as the deployments to Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, the Sinai, and Somalia 
                                                 
75 Dr Leslie Lewis, “Preparing for the Next Externally Mandated Review” page 44. 
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 put into question the way our forces were being utilized, and the effect on the military’s 
capability to respond to the two major theater war scenario.  Lastly, the projected funding 
requirements to purchase new weapon systems for the different services were far greater 
than available or projected funds.   
For the review, Congress legislated that the QDR specifically address the 
following issues: 
• US defense strategy and the force structure required to implement it. 
• The nature of threats to US national security. 
• All assumptions used during the review. 
• The effect of planning for, training, and conducting peace operations and 
military operations other than war on force structure requirements. 
• The effects of technology on force structure requirements. 
• The manpower levels and force structure levels required to sustain conflicts 
longer than 120 days. 
• The roles and missions of the reserve components. 
• The “tooth to tail” ratio of combat and support forces.76 
• Airlift and sealift requirements to support the defense strategy. 
• The “forward presence,” and pre-positioning of assets needed for deterrence 
and response to expected conflicts.77 
• The amount of resources that would need to be shifted between theaters of 
operation in the event of conflict. 
• Any suggested revisions to the Unified Command Plan.78 
 
From the above tasks, The QDR would evaluate the strategy of the Army in terms 
of its size, force structure, equipment, and active / reserve force mix to deal with the 
myriad of threats within its traditional sphere of operations.  From the Army perspective, 
the QDR would analyze its ability to: 
• Deter and defeat attacks on the US. 
• Deter and defeat aggression against allies. 
                                                 
76 “Tooth to Tail” ratio refers to the ratio of required combat support and combat service support forces to field a 
specified amount of combat forces. 
77 This refers to the amount of military weapons and assets located in cache sites overseas that forces in the US could 
draw and use in the event of conflict.  It basically refers to the size of forces that would be required in Europe and 
Korea based on the Cold War paradigm.  
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Defense Review (QDR) Analysis; A Retrospective Look at Joint Staff Participation,”  ISBN:0-8330-2694-1, RAND 
National Defense Research Institute, Santa Monica, CA, 1999, page vii. 
 • Protect the lives of US citizens abroad. 
• Support regional stability. 
• Counter threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). 
• Deter and counter terrorism. 
• Conduct disaster relief and humanitarian operations. 
• Counter the production and import of illegal drugs.79 
 
The QDR was an exhaustive inventory of every area of Army planning, and 
would put existing programs and force structure justifications under the microscope.  Not 
surprisingly,  the Army viewed the QDR as an “exercise with little hope for gain and a 
high risk for loss.”80   Going into the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Army was 
fully expecting to lose two active component divisions, based on its previous internal 
reviews.  The Army senior leadership, in preparation for the QDR, searched for any and 
all possible ways to justify its 10 active component division force structure, regardless of 
the QDR’s emphasis on transforming the force for the requirements of the 21st century.  
E.   QDR RESULTS FOR THE ARMY 
The results of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review were quite enlightening for 
Army leadership.  First of all, the QDR revealed that the Army’s methodology for force 
structure requirements81 was outdated and flawed.  The two major theater war planning 
scenario the Army used to justify its force structure was viewed as a vestige of the Cold 
War.  However, the QDR also documented that Army forces were far more heavily 
engaged than during the Cold War in overseas stability and support operations, in support 
of the National Military Strategy element of “Shaping” the international security 
                                                 
79 Ibid., page viii. 
80 John Y. Schrader, Leslie Lewis, Roger Allen Brown, “Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Analysis; A 
Retrospective Look at Joint Staff Participation,”  ISBN:0-8330-2694-1, RAND National Defense Research Institute, 
Santa Monica, CA, 1999, page xii. 
81 Namely, the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process, which used the two-MTW scenario as its primary justification.  
This TAA process was used in all of the aforementioned internal reviews (1991 “Base Force,” 1991 Commission On 
Roles and Means [CORM], 1993 Bottoms-Up Review [BUR], etc.)  
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 environment.  The end result was that the QDR rated the Army’s active duty force 
structure of 10 divisions “about right” for current requirements.82  Surprisingly, the force 
structure and missioning of the Army’s reserve forces was not evaluated, due primarily to 
their “secondary” role in the two major theater war scenario.  Secondly, the QDR 
criticized the Army’s efforts to “Prepare Now” for future requirements, labeled “Force 
XXI.”83  The modernization of the Army’s existing heavy divisions with technological 
advances such as digitization was viewed with skepticism.  There was no detail on the 
how much more effective the new forces would be, or what they would look like.  
Secondly, there was no concrete information on how much the transformation would 
cost.   
Basically, the Army was committed to its heavy division force structure as its 
“vision” for the future, despite the growing realization that the existing heavy divisions 
were enormously cumbersome, and the “tooth to tail” ratio made rapid deployments of 
such forces extremely difficult, if not impossible.  Lastly, expensive future weapon 
systems such as the Comanche Helicopter and the Crusader self-propelled Howitzer were 
called into question, especially since the funding for these new weapons was currently 
unavailable and unlikely to be procured.   
The QDR basically revealed that the Army was on the wrong path for the 
requirements of the next century, and urged that it prepare more realistically for future 
missions.  As demonstrated by the fact that the reserve component was not even 
addressed in the Army’s future planning, there was no specific planning evident for 
“Homeland Security,” or any restructuring or modernization of the Reserves and National 
Guard.  The Army viewed “Homeland Security” as a core competency of the National 
Guard, something it could accomplish with existing assets in a “state” role.  It clearly 
interpreted the requirement to “Prepare Now” as a method to modernize for the next 
conventional peer, instead of focusing on “Homeland Security.”  
                                                 
82 John Y. Schrader, “Quadrennial Defense Review Analysis,” page 31. 
83 Force XXI refers to the next stage of the Army’s progression on its way to the Army After Next (AAN). 
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 The Army, regardless of the criticisms for retaining a “Cold War” posture and 
organization,84 was extremely pleased with the outcome of the 1997 QDR.  The primary 
goal was achieved, in that the Army was able to retain its 10 active component divisions. 
The expected reductions in end strength were much smaller than anticipated, and could 
be accomplished by spreading them across the “less relevant” National Guard, Reserves, 
and civilian work forces.  However, this approach met with considerable resistance, and 
highlighted an additional finding of the QDR. 
F.   THE FALLOUT BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE NATIONAL GUARD 
The 1997 QDR aggravated a sore point for the Army leadership; namely the roles, 
missions, and relevance of the Reserve Component.  Surprisingly, the specific utilization, 
integration, and modernization of the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard were 
not addressed in the 1997 QDR.  This was due primarily to the active component view of 
National Guard combat units as a “strategic reserve.”  In other words, the two major 
theater war scenario involved only the active component divisions.  National Guard 
combat units would only be called upon in such a scenario if the conflict was not 
resolved within a specified time frame, or active forces were required to redeploy to 
another conflict.  Based on existing deployment practices, National Guard combat units 
would deploy to theater 45 to 60 days after mobilization, and would be committed only 
when the situation was under control.  Basically, the National Guard was viewed as less 
“relevant” to future warfighting requirements.85 
This view was to some extent a product of necessity.  The Army has by far the 
largest reserve components of any of the armed services.  The sheer size of the National 
Guard and Army Reserve, (over 550,000 soldiers)86 coupled with their secondary role as 
                                                 
84 Dr Leslie Lewis, Roger Allen Brown, and John Y. Schrader, “Preparing for the Next Externally Mandated Review:  
Identification of Cross-Cutting Issues Supporting Army Senior Leadership Decision Making,” Rand Corporation 
Study, Number DRR-2176-A, May 2000., page 44. 
85 John Y. Schrader, “Quadrennial Defense Review Analysis,” page 32. 
86 The Army National Guard currently has over 350,800 members and the Army Reserve has over 205,000 (Sources:  
National Guard strength: MG Raymond J. Rees, Vice Chief, National Guard Bureau, in a presentation to the Naval 
Postgraduate School titled “The National Guard,”  9 March 2000. Slide 16.  Army Reserve  strength: Army Reserve 
Online, “About Us,” available online at http://www.army.mil/usar/ .  Accessed 14 October 2002.  
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 a “strategic reserve” have put them at the bottom of the list for fielding modernized 
equipment.  Due to budget constraints in the era of draw down, the Army has practiced 
the modernization strategy of “cascading.”  Equipment from first-to-fight units in the 
Army has been “cascaded” down to the Army Reserve and then the National Guard as 
new technology and weapons enter the force.  During the Cold War, this was not a 
serious problem, as most of the equipment was interoperable, and tactics remained 
relatively uniform across the different components.  However, over the last decade, 
weapons technology and tactics have advanced at exponential rates, creating a unique 
problem for the Army.  The end result is that the National Guard is often equipped with 
military hardware and tactics that are not compatible with the first-to-fight units.87  
Despite these difficulties, the Army has never seriously considered modernizing the 
entire National Guard and Reserves, as the cost would far exceed the available budget.  
Since the reserves have never been incorporated into the two major theater war scenario 
per se, and their “cascaded” equipment is often incompatible with that of the active 
component, the National Guard contribution to the two major theater war strategy was 
deemed minimal.   
Based on the recommendations of the QDR, viewed then as binding, the Army 
was supposed to lose 45,000 personnel in effective end strength.  The Army leadership, 
without consulting the National Guard or the Army Reserve, decided that the reserve 
components should bear the brunt of these force cuts, based upon its relevance (or lack 
thereof) to the two major theater war scenario.  This resulted in a major conflict between 
the Army and its National Guard counterpart.  The acrimony between the two 
components reached such ferocity that the Secretary of Defense was forced to direct an 
off-site conference to resolve the issue.  On one hand, the Army was attempting to 
                                                 
87 The Army’s situation with regard to interoperability is unique among the services.  The Air Force and Marines, 
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Reserve, and Air National Guard.  Another example is the commonality of aircraft between the United States Marines 
and the Marine Corps Reserves.  Both operate the same model of AH-1W attack helicopter and UH-1N utility 
helicopter, and modernization efforts cover all aircraft in the inventory.  Source: Eric Bleakney, “The 2000 Army 
Aviation Modernization Plan effect on Active Component Army and Army National Guard Interoperability and 
Integration,” Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, December 2000, Page 86.  
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 comply with the provisions of the 1997 QDR and execute the manpower reductions in 
what it thought was the most prudent way; namely, reducing the size of its strategic 
reserve.  On the other hand, the National Guard argued that its contributions to National 
Security and National Military Strategy through “Homeland Security” were ignored.     
Not surprisingly, the agreement reached at the off-site conference did not suit any 
of the parties.  The active component Army agreed to lose 15,000 personnel, and the 
Army Reserve and National Guard were directed to give up 45,000 personnel.88   The off-
site conference led to a fierce debate between the active component Army and the 
National Guard over the future roles and missions of each component, and fostered bad 
blood between the two components.  However, it also raised the visibility of the National 
Guard’s importance in performing “Homeland Security.”  Deputy Secretary of Defense 
John Hamre, in an address to the Adjutant General’s Association of the United States on 
February 3rd, 1998, stated:  
…You know, the truth is that last year [1997] was a bad year.  It was a bad 
year for the Guard.  It was a bad year for the Army. And frankly, it was a 
bad year for America… it’s not good to have that kind of a fight in the 
family…I honestly believe that the Army and the Guard cannot live 
without each other...89  
 
He continued by pointing out that the National Guard and the Army are “equals in 
defending America,” and that the defense mission of the next century was Homeland 
Security, stating that “…Homeland Security…could not be more important for the 
National Guard to embrace as a mission.”90  The National Defense Panel, in its 
evaluation of future threats facing the United States, criticized the Army and the Army 
National Guard heavily for their “destructive disunity.”91  The National Defense Panel 
recommended that the National Guard play a larger role in Homeland Security by 
                                                 
88 The reserves would have to give up personnel on a three to one ratio, based on cost estimates. Dr Leslie Lewis, 
“Preparing for the Next Externally Mandated Review”, page 45. 
89 John J. Hamre, Speech,  “Changing Role of the Guard,” Defense Issues, Volume 13, Number 19, February 3, 1998, 
page 2.  Availableat http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1998/s19980203-depsecdef.html, accessed 11 April 2001. 
90 Hamre, “Changing Role of the Guard,” page 6. 
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Accessed 11 April 2001. 
 “…responding to domestic emergencies, terrorist attacks, and attacks using weapons of 
mass destruction.”92   
Sadly, the results of the 1997 QDR were never fully implemented.  The 
fundamental changes to the Department of Defense specified in the legislation were 
never realized, partly due to the inflexibility of large institutional bureaucracies.  Another 
blow to the implementation of the 1997 QDR came in the form of the Congressional 
Balanced Budget amendment of 1997.  Originally, the 45,000 man reduction in end 
strength was originally a partial measure to fund the Army’s transformation for the next 
century, the majority of which would be funded, or so it was hoped, with future 
appropriations.  With the Balanced Budget Amendment, the possibility of future 
appropriations for modernization vanished, so there was no incentive to follow through 
on the force reductions.  In addition, the increased OPTEMPO caused by deployments to 
Kosovo, Bosnia, and Southwest Asia caused all of the services by 1999 to request 
increases to their force structures and budgets. 93   
Despite these setbacks, the Army began to see that the Quadrennial Defense 
Review could be used to its advantage.  It was an unbiased, external assessment of each 
branch’s ability to perform its mission as defined by National Military Strategy, and 
carried more weight in requesting budget resources than any internal assessment.  After 
all, the QDR recognized the increasing requirement of the Army to deploy overseas to 
execute National Military Strategy, and allowed it to keep its 10 active division force 
structure. 
Due to the overall effectiveness of the 1997 QDR in examining the individual 
service branches’ methodology in preparing for future operations, Congress passed the 
“National Defense Authorization Act” for Fiscal Year 2000, requiring that a formal QDR 
be conducted every four years.94  Based on lessons learned and shortcomings from first 
Quadrennial Defense Review, the scope and language of the assessment was rewritten to 
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 focus on specific areas.  The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review would be composed of 
three primary tasks: 
1. Outline the national defense strategy consistent with the most recent National 
Security Strategy. 
2. Define the force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, and budget 
plans required for each service to execute the full range of operational missions 
defined in the national defense strategy. 
3. Determine a budget plan that would provide sufficient resources to “execute 
successfully” the full range of missions delineated in the defense strategy at a low 
to moderate risk.95 
 
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2000 also specified the following 
reports be included in the Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 (QDR 01):96 
• The full gamut of threats to defined US national security interests and the 
methodology used to examine those threats. 
• Assumptions relating to levels of engagement in Military Operations 
Other Than War (MOOTW) and Small-Scale Contingency operations 
(SSC), particularly exit strategies and withdrawal plans. 
• Effect of preparation for and participation in MOOTW and SSC 
operations on readiness for high-intensity combat missions. 
• The status of readiness for existing forces within each branch. 
• The roles and missions of the reserve components in the national defense 
strategy, and the readiness of the reserve component to perform those 
directed missions. 
                                                 
95 Ibid, page 2. “Low to Moderate” risk is defined by the Secretary of Defense in concert with the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and concerns the political, strategic, and military risks involved in executing the missions 
delineated in the national defense strategy. 
96 There were fourteen separate reports required in the QDR 01, which I have limited to five in the scope of this thesis. 
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 G.   THE ARMY’S PREPARATION FOR QDR 01 
In preparation for the QDR 01, The Army hired the Rand Arroyo Center in the 
fall of 1998 to assess the United States Army’s strategic planning.  The primary purpose 
of the research was to identify critical Army issues that would surface during 2001 QDR, 
and explore the relationships of Army issues with those of the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and Congress.97  Most of the issues selected for analysis 
by the Rand Corporation were developed from the issues raised in the 1997 QDR, and 
included concerns raised in Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), National Security 
Strategy, and National Military Strategy.  The Rand Corporation basically evaluated the 
thought process of Army leaders in preparing for operations in the next century, and was 
hired to point out shortcomings in their planning process, so that the Army could prepare 
for QDR 01.   
The first task was to evaluate all of the issues that confronted the Army that 
would surface in the QDR 01.  Included in the evaluation was the requirement from the 
1998 National Defense Panel (NDP) to focus on the issue of transformation, specifically 
the changes in doctrine, force structure and equipment required to meet the challenges of 
the 21st century.  In plain terms, this was the requirement for the Army to clarify its 
responsibilities and requirements for “Homeland Security.”  Of the original 58 issues 
confronting the Army, The Rand Corporation evaluation produced three major ‘issue 
sets’ that “were critical to both quelling external criticisms of the Army and telling the 
Army story.”98   These major issue sets were: 
1)  What strategic demands will be placed on the Army? 
2)  How will the future Army operate? 
3)  What is the required force size and content (Active and Reserve Component)? 
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 The first issue set (What strategic demands will be placed on the Army?) requires 
that the Army correctly understand the post-Cold War strategic environment, and the 
complexity of world affairs in which it will operate.  This includes the emergence of a 
conventional military peer in the near future and the assessment of asymmetric threats, 
such as terrorism and the possible use of weapons of mass destruction.  The Rand 
analysis concluded that although the Army did understand the strategic environment and 
it’s complex demands, “…the Army is (still) focusing …on the conventional response to 
two near-simultaneous major theater wars rather than on asymmetric threats.”99    
The Rand corporation concluded that the Army focused mainly on the traditional 
two major theater war scenario based on its institutional comfort with the Cold War 
strategic paradigm.  Rand suggested to the Army leadership that it focus its analysis on 
other strategic threats besides the emergence of a peer competitor, such as threats to the 
communications infrastructure, denial of access of Army forces in regional conflicts, and 
the use of weapons of mass destruction, especially on ports of debarkation where 
mobilizing Army forces assemble to deploy overseas.   
Basically, the Army was still focusing on the archaic two major theater war 
planning scenario to maintain the status quo in its present force structure and funding 
levels.  Any serious evaluation of “asymmetric” threats would endanger the current Army 
force structure of 10 combat divisions.  However, Rand concluded that the Army must 
evaluate these strategic threats to better plan and prepare for future operations.  This issue 
set forms the basis for all military planning; other issues such as size, force structure, 
equipment, and budgeting all revolve around the strategic demands.  President Bush, in 
an address February 13, 2001 to assembled sailors and NATO ambassadors in Norfolk, 
Virginia, stated “Our defense vision will drive our defense budget, not the other way 
around.”100   This fact clearly demonstrates why the Army has steadfastly stuck to the 
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 two major theater war planning scenario.  The Army was going to protect its combat 
readiness at all costs. 
The second issue set (How will the future Army operate?) requires that the Army 
leadership develop a “vision” that would be responsive to the full gamut of strategic 
demands placed upon it.  Primarily, this issue set deals with force modernization, 
integration, and transformation plans.  The Rand Corporation, interestingly, found the 
same shortcomings in Army planning during its evaluation that were identified in the 
1997 QDR and the National Defense Panel.  All three pushed for the Army to accelerate 
its move to a lighter, more mobile force.  The Army, Rand concluded, was basically still 
entrenched in the Cold War “conventional peer” mindset, and was spending an inordinate 
amount of time on creating a “digitized’ division (“Force XXI”).  This division is 
organized with the same type of equipment as the Army currently has, except the “tooth 
to tail” ratio is even larger than current units.  In other words, the Army was still stuck in 
the Cold War mindset of modernizing its heavy divisions with new equipment and 
technical wizardry, instead of planning for light and medium force deployments.  Rand 
correctly assessed that “new concepts [such as General Shinsecki’s “medium force” of 
Brigade Combat Teams] are often easy to conceive; the difficult part is their refinement, 
development, funding and implementation.”101   
The third issue set, (What is the required force size and content?), requires the 
Army determine the right force size and mix to meet mid-term and long-term strategic 
demands.  Basically, it revolves around the Army’s utilization of its reserve component, 
primarily the National Guard.  The Rand Corporation found that this issue is one that 
“continues to be a major internal issue for the Army.”102  Perhaps the most damning 
statement from the evaluation is that the “re-emphasis on the Homeland [Security] 
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 Mission…requires some rethinking of the [Army’s current force] structure justified on a 
2-Major Theater War strategy.”103   
The bottom line is that the Army mindset had not changed dramatically between 
the Quadrennial Defense Review in 1997 and the Rand assessment in 2000.  The active 
Army had basically ignored the requirements of the National Security and National 
Defense Strategy to contend with asymmetric threats and actively pursue “Homeland 
Security.”  Instead of embracing the “Homeland Security” mission, the Army leadership 
was still focused on the requirement to respond to two major theater wars.  The only area 
that saw a dramatic change between the 1997 QDR and the 2000 Rand study in terms of 
reserve component utilization was the increased reliance on the National Guard to 
perform peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions as part of the National Military 
Strategy of “shaping” the global security environment.   
However, by ignoring the strategic implications of Homeland Security, the Army 
actually put its combat capability at risk.  One of the threat scenarios deemed most likely 
to occur was that enemies of the United States would actually target our mobilization 
stations or nearby civilian communities for a terrorist attack using biological or chemical 
weapons, seriously disrupting the capability of our responses to respond to a major 
theater war.  Such an attack would be coordinated with an attack on national security 
interests overseas, with the intention of delaying or preventing our forces from 
deploying.104 
H.   CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated how the Army has misinterpreted the 
requirements of National Military Strategy to support “Homeland Security.”  It has 
steadfastly focused on its “core competency” of fighting and winning a conventional war, 
and protected its 10 active component division force structure at all costs.  When the 
Army developed its vision of being “persuasive in peace” and “invincible in war,” it was 
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 actively supporting what it thought were the requirements of National Military Strategy.  
It began to deploy overseas to “Shape” the international security environment; it 
maintained its heavy division force structure at all costs to “Respond” to crises; and it 
focused its modernization and digitization initiatives on the existing heavy division force 
structure to “Prepare Now” for future operations.  When the number of overseas 
deployments in the “Shaping” strategy began to affect the combat readiness for its 
“Respond” requirement, it looked to the Reserves and the National Guard to fill the gap.  
This fundamental change to the utilization of the reserves marked a large departure from 
what the framers of the Constitution envisioned for the role of the National Guard and 
Reserve. 
The changes brought about by the fall of the Soviet Union were far-ranging.  The 
major threat to US national security in the next century would not be from a major peer 
competitor; rather it would take the form of asymmetrical threats against our population 
centers, institutions, and infrastructure on domestic soil.  Numerous studies during the 
post-Cold War era documented the emerging threat of terrorism, electronic warfare, and 
the employment of weapons of mass destruction targeted against our civilians.  This 
caused governmental planners to focus on “Homeland Security” as the primary mission 
for the next century.  The National Guard’s core competency of Military Support to Civil 
Authorities, and the limitations of the Posse Comitatus Act on the employment of federal 
forces in domestic operations made the Guard perfectly suited for the mission.  However, 
the Army was too focused on “No More Koreas,” and preventing the mistakes of 
previous planners in the post-Cold War era of draw downs and budget cuts.  Since 
budgeting is inextricably linked to the defense strategy, the retention of combat forces to 
fight two major theater wars was deemed non-negotiable.  This one-track mindset caused 
the Army planners to neglect the contributions of the National Guard to the National 
Military Strategy.   
Instead of re-affirming the National Guard’s constitutional role to protect the 
population against domestic violence, and strengthening its capabilities to perform 
Homeland Security, the Army developed a new role for the Guard that was far from what 
the framers of the U.S. Constitution envisioned.  To protect the active Army’s ability to 
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 fight a conventional war, it called upon the Reserve and National Guard to “Shape” the 
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 V.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
When the Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia in 1787, one of the most 
profound challenges it had to face was how to defend the new nation.  The framers had to 
balance the need for defense with the risks and costs of maintaining a large standing 
force of “regular” soldiers.  The compromise they reached established a singularly unique 
defense organization:  a “militia” nation.  The defense of the nation would be founded on 
an organization comprised of a small standing Army under federal control, and a militia 
“reserve” that fell under state control during peacetime, and federal control in times of 
war or national emergency.  In doing so, the framers created a system of “checks and 
balances” on the power of the military.  Being a community-based organization, the 
militia was given the Constitutional mandate to defend the homeland against domestic 
threats.  This mission of “Homeland Security,” coupled with the federal mission to 
mobilize as a wartime strategic reserve, were deemed by the framers of the Constitution 
to be the primary role for the state militia. 
Much like the Constitution over the last two centuries, the structure of the US 
military has changed with the times, but held true to its nature.  The system of checks and 
balances the framers built into the organization of the military, created, by design, a 
friction between the regulars and the militia.  The issue of federal control over the 
structure, training, and mobilization of the militia reserve was bitterly fought by the 
active military and the state militias in Congress.  The next two centuries witnessed a 
series of changes to the size and strategic importance of the reserve component as threats 
to our national security changed; however, the fundamental nature of the militia as a state 
organization, and its role as a strategic reserve remained intact.  This constitutional 
paradigm remained in effect until the end of the Cold War. 
The abrupt end of the Cold War in 1991 led to profound changes in the global 
security environment, and translated into fundamental redefinitions of our National 
Security and National Military Strategies.  With the loss of the Soviet Union as a major 
peer competitor, the military, as it had in the past, was expected to downsize accordingly 
in the post-Cold War era.  This meant huge reductions in the force structure, size, and 
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 budgets of the military, especially the United States Army.  However, stung by the 
disastrous effects of an ill-planned and ill-executed demobilization after World War II, 
the Army vowed that it would never again lose its combat readiness.  It viewed its ability 
to fight and win two major theater wars as non-negotiable, and equated this requirement 
to maintaining a force structure of 10 active Army divisions.  This guiding principle, born 
of the Cold War era, would remain firmly entrenched in the Army mindset, despite the 
realities of the post-Cold War geostrategic environment.   
In determining a National Military Strategy for the next era, military planners had 
to first evaluate all existing and potential threats to our national security.  The 
technological revolution that led to the demise of the Warsaw Pact as a major peer 
competitor also led to a transformation in the nature and gravity of threats on the global 
horizon.  The technology to build chemical, biological, and even nuclear weapons 
became readily available.  With the collapse of the Soviet economy, the ingredients to 
build weapons of mass destruction also became more accessible to potential adversaries.  
With our demonstrated superiority in military, political, and economic capabilities, 
enemies would have to resort to attacking the US by “asymmetric” means.  The only area 
that military planners deemed vulnerable to such attacks was our homeland; namely, our 
civilian population, critical infrastructure, and economy.   
On the conventional front, no major global peer competitor was expected to 
emerge until at least 2015, even though there were hostile regional powers such as China, 
North Korea, and Iraq.  Intelligence analysts also concluded that there would be 
numerous small scale conflicts developing in the absence of the stability generated during 
the bipolar world.  These disputes on the lower end of the Spectrum of Military 
Conflict,105 if allowed to escalate, could pose a threat to our national security interests 
overseas, or those of our allies.  These three threats (small scale conflicts, conventional 
peer competitor, and weapons of mass destruction106), and the government’s plans to 
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106 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) refer to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons aimed at non-military 
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 prevent, mitigate, and respond to them became the core elements of the US National 
Security Strategy.         
To execute this security strategy, military planners had to develop a new and 
profoundly different National Military Strategy.  The military strategy during the Cold 
War was one of “deterrence.”  Commonly known as “Mutually Assured Destruction,” or 
“MAD,” the main tenet of deterrence was that regardless of who struck first, the survivor 
would maintain enough nuclear capability to ensure the mutual destruction of the 
attacker.  This philosophy lent a certain degree of stability to the global geostrategic 
environment during the Cold War.  However, with the disappearance of a major 
competitor, the military strategy for the 21st century would require “forward engagement” 
to ensure global stability.  The new strategy called upon the respective branches107 of the 
military to “Shape” the international security environment, “Respond” to crises, and 
“Prepare Now” for fighting the threats of the future.  The “Shape” element required 
deploying overseas for humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, and stability / support 
operations.  This would mitigate the security threat from small-scale  conflicts.  The 
“Respond” component, meanwhile, was one military planners were more familiar with; 
namely, fighting and winning major conflicts.  This would alleviate the security risk from 
a regional power or emerging peer competitor.  The “Prepare Now” requirement, 
however, would prove much more difficult for military planners to articulate.  It would 
require the military to transform its structure, roles, and equipment to deal with 
asymmetric future threats.  This part of the strategy was intended to mitigate the threats 
of terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction on our homeland. 
The Army, in translating the National Military Strategy into a vision statement for 
the future, was fundamentally blinded by its mindset of maintaining the conventional 
combat capability to respond to two major theater wars.  “The Army Vision…Soldiers 
On Point For the Nation” described the requirements of the active Army to support 
National Military Strategy.  The Army understood the “Shape” requirement, and 
professed that it would be “Persuasive in Peace”.  It wholeheartedly embraced the 
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 mission of deploying overseas to extinguish small-scale conflicts before they became a 
major threat to US interests.  The “Respond” element, however, only served to reinforce 
the Army’s determination to maintain its 10 active component divisions, and re-validated 
its Cold War “two-major theater war” planning scenario.  One of the major arguments of 
this thesis is that the last requirement to “Prepare Now” was fundamentally 
misinterpreted by the Army leadership.   
Instead of restructuring, reorganizing, and remissioning the Army, in particular 
the Army National Guard for the asymmetric threats of terrorism and weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) against our civilian population, the Army embarked on a strategy 
called “Force XXI”.  This was the Army’s modernization imperative to strengthen the 
combat firepower of its heavy divisions to fight the next peer competitor or hostile 
regional power.  Aside from funding the development of some regional Civil Support 
Teams, it considered that WMD consequence management could be handled by the Army 
National Guard in its secondary, “state” role.  It did not actively incorporate the 
requirements of National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy to make 
“Homeland Security” a priority federal mission for the National Guard. 
As the Army began to execute the requirements of National Military Strategy, it 
ran into an interesting, and escalating, dilemma that was not anticipated:  It could not 
continue to support the “Shape” strategy without jeopardizing its ability to “Respond”.  
In other words, it could not continue to deploy overseas for peacekeeping and stability / 
support operations at the rate it was being asked to, without seriously impacting its 
capability to fight a war.  Even though the Army was successful in maintaining its ten 
active division force structure in the post-Cold War era, it was not enough.  Military 
planners anticipated neither the frequency of deployments nor the impact that such 
missions would have on the ability of its forces to wage war.  This situation, coupled with 
the ever-prevalent mindset of maintaining a two-major theater war capability, forced the 
Army to look to its strategic reserve for help.   
Meanwhile, the opportunities of the post-Cold War environment looked bleak for 
the Army Reserve and National Guard, especially after the boon to force structure and 
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 funding enjoyed during the Reagan years.  The same Revolution in Military Affairs108 
that helped win the Cold War also seriously threatened the relevance of the National 
Guard and Reserve in future strategic planning.  The ever-accelerating rate of 
technological advancement prevented the equipment and tactics of the Army’s “first to 
fight” units from cascading down to the reserve component.  The Army Reserve and 
National Guard found itself with legacy equipment that was not interoperable with the 
Active Army.  This situation sent the leadership of the reserve components on a “search 
for relevance.”  It was not long before they ran into the active Army leadership, which 
was searching for help in executing the National Military Strategy of “Shaping” the 
international security environment. 
Together, the Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve leadership 
embarked on a path that would fundamentally change the constitutional underpinnings of 
the reserve components’ role as a “strategic reserve.”  Now they would stand side by side 
with the active Army in executing the National Military Strategy, performing missions 
together across the broad spectrum of military conflict.  Not coincidentally, this was 
precisely what the Department of Defense called for in it’s “Total Force” policy, which 
Army Chief of Staff General Shinsecki translated into “THE Army” policy.  This policy 
was intended to blur the traditional lines between the active Army, the Army Reserve, 
and the Army National Guard.  However, this was a distinction not intended to be blurred 
by the framers of the Constitution.   
This radical transformation of the reserves’ Constitutional role was carried out 
based on a fundamental misinterpretation of the requirements of National Military 
Strategy.  The “Prepare Now” strategy was a mandate for the Army to respond to the 
growing asymmetrical threats against our homeland.  This meant preventing and 
countering the threats of terrorism and the possible use of weapons of mass destruction 
against our civilian population, infrastructure, and government.  This mission was, in 
fact, a core competency of the National Guard in its state mission of “Military Support to 
Civil Authorities” (MSCA).  A re-interpretation of National Military Strategy actually 
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 stresses the increased utilization and federal funding of the National Guard for the 
“Prepare Now” element, not the “Shape” component.  In other words, the National 
Military Strategy actually calls for strengthening the constitutional role of the National 
Guard to perform its mission of “Homeland Security,” not the radical departure from the 
Constitution sought by the Army (and ironically, its National Guard counterpart) to 
perform overseas stability and support missions.  National Security and National Military 
Strategy actually dictate the National Guard “…fulfill its historic and Constitutional 
mission of homeland security.”109  In fact, the National Guard vision for the next century 
states, “Homeland Security is a logical extension of the Federal and State missions we 
already perform, and (are) consistent with our Constitutional foundation and militia 
heritage.”110     
A.    THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF RESERVE FORCE DEPLOYMENTS  
Instead of embarking on this path, however, the National Guard and Reserves are 
being activated at an unprecedented rate to perform the “shaping” portion of National 
Military Strategy.  However, this increased use of National Guard and Reserve personnel 
in peacekeeping missions overseas, albeit pragmatic and cost-effective, has its own 
peculiar set of drawbacks.  One side effect of using reserve personnel for overseas 
contingency operations is that they blunt the reserve’s combat readiness even more so 
than the active component.  The detrimental effect of training for peacekeeping duty, 
deploying, and re-training is magnified due to the limited amount of time reserve 
personnel can devote to relearning their wartime skills.  The primary result is that reserve 
forces are taking much longer to recover from these types of deployments.  
In another parallel with the active components, recruiting and retention problems 
have also cropped up in the National Guard and Reserves.  Once again, these side effects 
have been exacerbated by the nature of the citizen-soldier: Personnel are not re-enlisting 
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 and are resigning their commissions due to the strain of conflict with civilian employers 
over repeated deployments.  During Desert Shield / Desert Storm, the large majority of 
reservists and employers enthusiastically supported deployment.  Now, however, with 
routine deployments scheduled to support a growing number of dubious “national 
emergencies,” we have witnessed a greater number of complaints from both reservists 
and their employers.  Mobilizing and deploying reserve units, in many cases 
involuntarily111, places a great strain upon the citizen soldier, his employer, and his 
family.  The Constitutional contract with reserve personnel specifies that they would be 
mobilized and deployed only “…in times of war or national emergency.”  As the 
definition of “national emergency” has conveniently widened in our doctrine of global 
engagement to include the protection of vital national security interests overseas, “…our 
(reserve personnel) and our companies are caught in the middle.”112  An Army National 
Guard Major recently stated, “I have been working every weekend and most evenings for 
the past few months preparing a rifle company to deploy to Kuwait…on top of working 
50 hours a week at a civilian job.  The Patriot missile sites this unit will be providing 
security for have been in country for 10 years.  Where is the national emergency?”113   
In addition to the strain on the reservist, employers, especially small business 
owners, are feeling the crunch. Under the revised “Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA),” issued in 1994, employers must reinstate 
reservists upon completion of their tour of duty (anywhere from 180-270 days) with 
seniority, status, and rate of pay.  They also must not discriminate or punish employees 
based on their military commitments.114  As the number of reservists deployed overseas 
increases, so do the number of documented reservist-employer conflicts.  Within a week 
of Texas’ 49th Armored Division notification that that it was headed for Bosnia, the 
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 Department of Labor investigated over 28 complaints against employers.115  In a New 
York Times Page 1 article titled “Duty Calls the Guard, But Some Bosses Resist,” Steven 
Lee Myers reports, “For the Pentagon, these conflicts are more than just a legal headache.  
More than a third of enlisted reservists and 45 percent of officers say that their military 
service – even short of a long deployment like Texas’ 49th Armored Division’s (to 
Bosnia) – has created problems with their civilian bosses.  According to the Pentagon, a 
third of people who resign their commissions or choose not to re-enlist do so because of 
conflicts with employers.”116   
The utilization of the National Guard and Reserve to perform stability and support 
operations does offer significant benefits, however.  In addition to the relief of 
operational tempo on active component forces, reserve units have provided an 
unexpected benefit to our National Security Strategy: They have made tremendous 
impacts in promoting democracy and stabilizing the areas they have been deployed to.  
This is due in large part to two factors: First, in peacekeeping operations and 
humanitarian interventions, our citizen soldiers provide less of an ostensible “threat” to 
those nations in which we intervene.  Secondly, our reservists bring an unprecedented 
amount of civilian expertise to bear, in addition to their military specialties.  Reservists 
have fostered nation-building programs and have established civilian-civilian contacts 
that have endured far longer than their deployments.  “In Bosnia,” noted the 
Commanding General of Peacekeeping Operations during the rotation of Texas’ 49th 
Armored Division, “…we saw for the first time local military forces and local 
communities working together to help build the infrastructure.  They’ve rebuilt three 
bridges and completed one road project.  That wasn’t the case when we got here.  We’ve 
pushed the peace process forward.”117  
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 Herein lies the dilemma: As our National Security and National Military 
Strategies increasingly rely on Reserve and National Guard personnel to help shape the 
international security environment, it has both positive and negative impacts.  The active 
component is able to maintain combat readiness for large scale war, and our global 
engagement strategy is benefiting from the civilian expertise of our citizen soldiers.  In 
addition, the institutional survival of the Guard and Reserves is being further cemented 
with each deployment.  However, the burden for this increase in reserve utility has fallen 
squarely on the shoulders of our citizen soldiers, and they are the ones paying the price:  
Increased employer conflicts, deployment fatigue, decreased readiness, and declining 
recruiting and retention rates are but some of the indications. 
B.   LESSONS LEARNED FROM OTHER BRANCHES 
The future is not entirely bleak, however.  There have been a number of proposals 
to modify the way the Army is structured, as well as successes encountered by other 
branches in the way they utilize their reserve forces.  These proposals can have a 
tremendous impact on the Army’s ability to sustain its global engagement strategy, 
maintain combat readiness, and reduce the number of reserve activations.  It will also 
significantly reduce the number of employer complaints. 
The first proposal focuses primarily on creating a separate type of Army 
contingent dubbed a “Peace Force.”  This unit would be comprised of soldiers with 
common military occupational specialties, such as Infantry, Military Police, Engineers, 
Aviation, and other combat support and combat service support specialties.  A 
Regimental sized unit could be established, with equal sized active Army, Reserve, and 
National Guard contingents.  This “Peace Force” could be located across a few 
centralized training bases, and be specially trained and equipped to perform 
Humanitarian Relief and Peacekeeping missions.  This would preclude active Army 
combat units from suffering readiness problems associated with deployments overseas 
for contingency missions.  Philip Gold, a Senior Fellow and Director of Defense and 
Aerospace Studies at Seattle’s “Discovery Institute,” suggests that such forces would be 
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 “better equipped and quicker to respond”118 to such missions as Bosnia and Kosovo.  He 
continued by saying that the United States needs “…forces suited (primarily) to keeping 
the peace.”119  Such a force would solve numerous problems.  It would eliminate the 
need to retrain and equip combat units for the peacekeeping mission, and would reduce 
the requirement for National Guard and Reserve deployments by rotating the mission 
among the three components.  As the soldiers for these units would be drawn from 
volunteers, it would eliminate the warrior vs. constabulary ethos dilemma, thus 
improving unit morale.  However, as these forces would come out of the existing hide of 
current units, it would meet with considerable resistance from the active Army, unless 
funded separately. 
Another proposal, both more palatable and feasible to accomplish, is to change 
the deployment practices currently used by the Army to those used by the Air Force.  
Under the Presidential Select Reserve Call-Up (PSRC), Army reservists are typically 
called up for a period of 180 to 270 days.  As the length of US presence in one area 
continues, deployment lengths typically increase to the 270 day limit.  To reduce the 
number of employer conflicts with such deployments, General Shinsecki, the Army Chief 
of Staff, made an announcement on 6 March 2000 limiting National Guard and Reserve 
deployments in Bosnia to 6 months.  While this is a step in the right direction, “…it 
didn’t go far enough,” said Major General E. Gordon Stump, the President of the 
National Guard Association of the United States.120  He recommends that the Army go to 
a system like the Air Force’s Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF).   
As part of the armed forces’ “Total Force” policy, the Air Force has made the 
largest steps in unifying its three components.  The EAF is comprised of active Air Force, 
Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard units.  They train together and deploy 
together as one package.  Typically, these forces are notified at least two years in 
advance of a deployment (the Army routinely notifies soldiers and units less than 180 
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 days from deployment), and the EAF deploys for a period of only 90 days.  If the mission 
requires a longer on-station time, another EAF is rotated in.  Senator Kay Bailey 
Hutchison (R-Tex), who led a congressional delegation to Bosnia, stated, “It would be 
my hope that that if we are going to use (Army) Guard units in peacekeeping operations, 
that we would have much shorter mission times.”121  The Air Force EAF model has 
benefits for all the armed services.  By limiting deployments to 90 days and increasing 
notification times, it serves the needs of the Army overseas as well as “better serving the 
needs of their most valuable resources, their soldiers and families…the Army could 
select units, develop rotations, and satisfy unique requirements while minimizing the 
stress on people and units.”122  It would greatly reduce the impact of a reservist’s 
deployment on his civilian employer by reducing the length of his deployment, and 
increasing the time available to find a temporary replacement.  According to General 
Stump, “The Air Force is experiencing ‘real success’ with its 90-day, Expeditionary 
Aerospace Force program.  The Army would be wise to follow suit.”123  Both of these 
options offer real solutions to the Army’s problems, and if implemented, could pave the 
way for more integration of the National Guard and Army Reserves into General 
Shinsecki’s vision of “The Army.” 
C.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although General Shinsecki’s “The Army” initiative is making tremendous 
strides in blurring the distinctions between active duty and reserve soldiers, there are 
differences that should not, and cannot be ignored.  The reservist, by nature, is a “citizen 
soldier;” a civilian who serves the military part-time.  As we increase the number of 
involuntary deployments of our reservists overseas, we run the danger of doing 
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 permanent harm to the capability of our reserve forces. Charles L. Cragin assessed the 
situation correctly:  
The bottom line is that we cannot overuse our reservists without seeing a 
corresponding increase in attrition and a decline in readiness.  In the end, 
we must strike a balance, so that we create a Total Force that is 
appropriately sized for missions and staffed with people who want to serve 
but who do not find the burdens of that service so onerous they leave.124  
  
The National Guard and Reserves are filled with volunteers, who for the most part 
join to perform what they believe is their patriotic duty.  These men and women are 
employed full time in the civilian workforce, and train typically one weekend per month 
and two weeks per year in their military occupational specialties.  The increased 
expectation of the part-time “citizen-soldier” to perform overseas stability and support 
operations, such as the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, means that these reservists will 
be deployed anywhere from six to nine months.  This creates numerous challenges for 
both reservists and their civilian employers.  The increased burden on the “citizen 
soldier” to support national military strategy begs the question, “What is the price of 
patriotism?”  In other words, what should the role and expectations of the National Guard 
and Reserves be in the 21st century security environment? 
 This question has recently been complicated by the events surrounding September 
11th, and the ensuing war on terrorism.  “Homeland Security” has become a major focus 
of the US government in general, and the US military specifically.  The roles and 
missions of the National Guard have come under the spotlight, especially their capability 
to respond to and manage the consequences of domestic attacks.  The simple fact is that 
the National Guard now has two missions that are in direct competition.  Army and 
National Guard leaders are being asked to weigh the contribution of the National Guard 
to support overseas peacekeeping missions with their capability to perform homeland 
security, with the realization that they cannot do both. 
I believe that “Homeland Security” should be made a primary federal mission for 
the National Guard.  Even though regarded as a core competency, it still considered a 
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 secondary, “state” mission by the active Army, and National Guard readiness to perform 
“Homeland Security” is not directly funded.  Both the active Army and National Guard 
leadership, in my opinion, fear that “Homeland Security” will become the primary 
mission for the National Guard, and have vocally resisted any such initiatives.  The active 
Army needs the National Guard to perform overseas stability and support missions, and 
the National Guard fears a tremendous loss of funding and relevance if relegated to 
performing only domestic support operations.  In my opinion, the threat to national 
security by weapons of mass destruction used against our population, infrastructure, and 
economy far outweigh the threat of a major theater war, both in probability and 
consequence.  The National Guard, as the primary responder, needs to be provided with 
the requisite equipment, training, and OPTEMPO funding to successfully perform 
consequence management operations.  However, even though homeland security should 
be a federally funded mission, I do not believe it should come at the expense of our 
traditional wartime mission to mobilize and support the active component in times of war 
or national emergency.  If homeland security is elevated to a primary federal mission for 
the National Guard, it will have the funding and capability to perform both missions, 
provided the Army and National Guard restructure their forces. 
To achieve this capability, I believe that the current demographics of the Army 
National Guard in relation to the overall percentages of combat, combat support, and 
combat service support assets needs to be altered dramatically to support homeland 
security initiatives125.  Homeland security missions require a preponderance of combat 
support and combat service support units to successfully mitigate the consequences of a 
domestic attack.  Although the National Guard must retain some combat units to augment 
the Active Army in a two theater war scenario, the current ratio of 54% combat forces in 
the National Guard is far too high.  The majority of combat units should be in the Active 
Army, where they can perform overseas stability and support missions, and retain the 
capability to respond to a two major theater war scenario.  The percentage of combat 
forces, in my opinion, should be increased to 65% in the active Army, and reduced to 
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 35% in the National Guard.  The National Guard needs to be redesigned and reformed 
with one basic premise in mind: every unit in the National Guard needs to be able to 
support homeland security in some capacity.  If it does not, then it needs to be moved to 
the active Army or Army Reserve. 
For example, major combat multiplier units, such as army aviation attack 
helicopter units, should be assigned entirely to the active component.  There is simply no 
homeland security mission that attack helicopters can perform, and they require 
inordinate amounts of funding to maintain minimum combat readiness levels.  
Compounding the problem is the fact that National Guard units are outfitted with older 
equipment that is not compatible or “interoperable” with that of the active Army.126  The 
existing attack helicopters and mission should be given to the regular Army, and replaced 
with utility or medium-lift helicopter units.  The active Army could more easily fund the 
modernization of the attack helicopters, and the utility or medium-lift helicopters given to 
the National Guard could perform both a wartime and a homeland security mission.  On 
the other hand, standard infantry units in the National Guard could be largely retained, as 
the troops could perform a myriad of homeland security support missions in addition to 
the primary mission of augmenting the active Army in times of war or national 
emergency.   
The National Guard, in the form of the militia, has been around for 366 years.  
The organization predates the founding of our nation.  This institution has adapted 
numerous times over the last two centuries, and I believe it is capable of conforming to 
the realities of the 21st century security landscape.  I believe that our citizen soldiers have 
a lot to offer in the way of nation-building and promoting peace, and those strengths need 
to be capitalized upon.  However, I also believe that the current problems facing the 
National Guard and Reserves, primarily the conflict with civilian employers, needs to be 
seriously addressed.  If the Army adopts a policy similar to the Air Force’s Expeditionary 
                                                 
126 The National Guard is equipped with AH-64A Apache helicopters, whereas the active Army has AH-64D 
“Longbow” helicopters.  These two aircraft, although sharing the same airframe, are not compatible on the modern 
battlefield.  For an in-depth examination of this problem, refer to MAJ Eric Bleakney’s Naval Postgraduate thesis titled 
“The 2000 Army Aviation Modernization Plan effect on Active Component Army and Army National Guard 
Interoperability and Integration,”  December 2000.  
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 Aerospace Force, whereby deployments are shortened and formal notice of deployments 
are lengthened, we can virtually eliminate the greatest threat to the future employment of 
the reserves: conflicts with civilian employers.  
I believe that the current initiatives for “Total Force” integration are necessary, 
and in the Army’s case, will do much to reduce the intra-service rivalry that has marked 
the Army and the National Guard’s history over the last 220 years.  I believe that our 
citizen soldiers should serve a greater purpose than being merely a strategic manpower 
reserve.  As our National Security and National Military Strategies change with the 
realities of the 21st century security environment, so must the Cold War approach to the 
utilization of our reserve forces.  Reservists are now, and need to be more than just 
“weekend warriors.”  If the constitutional premise for the mobilizing the Army Reserves 
and National Guard “during war or national emergency” needs to be amended to allow 
them to promote peace overseas, then so be it.  At the same time, the structure of the 
National Guard needs to be altered to better perform homeland security.  If initiatives 
such as those outlined above are instituted, the three components that that comprise the 
Army of today; the active Army, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard, will 
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Appendix A, Figure 5. (Figures 1-4 in main body text)  “Spectrum of Military 
Operations”. Source: MS PowerPoint presentation by LTG Kevin P. Byrnes, 
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, in a presentation to the Naval 
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Outlay = $1.84 
Trillion
(16% of Federal)
(9.7% Army, 2.4% DoD)
 
Appendix A, Figure 6. “Army Fiscal year 2001 Budget”.  MS Powerpoint slide provided 
by MG Raymond J. Rees, Vice Chief, National Guard Bureau, in a presentation to the 
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! Fundamental goals endure
! World remains volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous













• Deploy, Fight, and Win Major Theater War
• Promote Regional Stability
• Reduce potential Conflicts and Threats
• Deter Aggression and Coercion
• Conduct Small-Scale Contingencies (SSC)
• Support Homeland Defense
• Provide Domestic Support to Civil Authorities
Army 
Guidance
ARMY’s STRATEGIC PURPOSE 
UNCHANGED
Prompt, Sustained Land Dominance
• COMPEL  ENEMIES
• REASSURE ALLIES/PARTNERS
• DETER POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES
• SUPPORT DOMESTIC COMMUNITIES
SECDEF 
Guidance
Appendix A, Figure 7. “Army Strategic Vision Development.” MS Powerpoint slide 
provided by LTG Kevin Byrnes, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, US Army, in a 
presentation to the Naval Postgraduate School titled “The Army Transformation 
Overview,”  5 June 2000.  Slide 6.
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